





AIR  
UNIVERSITY  
**review**

JULY-AUGUST 1974





UNITED  
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**REVIEW**





# AIR UNIVERSITY review

THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

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
Address manuscripts to Editor, Air University Review Division, Bldg. 1211, Maxwell AFB, AL 36112. Printed by Government Printing Office. Address subscriptions to Superintendent of Documents, GPO, Washington DC 20402: yearly \$8.00 domestic, \$10.00 foreign; single copy \$1.50.



the cover

U.S. foreign policy within the global environment is encountering the shifting diplomatic currents of all the major powers toward a multipolar international order in place of the bipolar one of recent times. Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., in a concrete analysis of the task facing the United States, says the key to national security is military and economic strength to counter Soviet aims for unilateral advantage and achieve a "structure for peace" in which all nations will have a stake.







# NATIONAL SECURITY IN A DECADE OF TRANSITION

DR. ROBERT L. PFALTZGRAFF, JR.

THE foreign policy of the United States is shaped by many forces. They include the international environment, the military and non-military capabilities available for the pursuit of national objectives, the nature of the threats posed by other states, the structure of the foreign policy decision-making machinery, and the capacity of the leaders to muster whatever level of public support may be necessary for the pursuit of foreign policy goals at any time.

U.S. foreign policy in the 1970s represents a response to such factors, but especially to perceived changes in the international environment as well as an altered U.S. domestic commitment to foreign affairs. The Nixon Doctrine is based on several assumptions which differentiate the present international system from that of the decade after World War II: Western Europe and Japan have become centers of strength economically but not militarily, and the Communist bloc has been fragmented by the deep rift between Moscow and Peking. As a result, there is a new fluidity in the diplomacy of all major powers in an increasingly heterogeneous and complex world. At the same time the military power of the Soviet Union has grown to such a level as to constitute a form of "parity" with the United States.<sup>1</sup> The growth of Soviet military power enhances the need for the United States not only to contemplate qualitative improvements in its own defense capabilities—such as those proposed by Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, including the development of more accurate delivery capabilities at both the strategic and tactical levels as part of its overall research and development program—but also to encourage the strengthening of other centers of power outside the United States, including China, as a counterpoise to the Soviet Union.

It is impossible, of course, to speak now of a fully multipolar international system or even to assume that such a system would inevitably be less prone to international conflict than the bipolar world of the past generation. Militarily, we are likely to remain in a largely bipolar world for at least the next several years. The military capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union vastly exceed those of other powers. But this condition may be modified by the latter 1970s, with the emergence of China as an increasingly powerful nuclear power. The eventual strengthening of European atomic capabilities and the growth of a significant Japanese defense force would also alter this condition.

Great imponderables prevent a definitive analysis of the military prospects for each of these powers. China is likely to face a leadership succession crisis and may even now be entering another phase of the cultural revolution that could alter her foreign policy and perhaps weaken her as a major power. The future of the Sino-Soviet relationship is uncertain, although there is not likely to be any marked improvement for at least the next several years. Western Europe is far from defense unity and shows few signs of developing either the political institutions or cohesiveness in policy essential to sustain centralized defense decision-making. The Japanese government and public alike remain divided about defense policy. Even if a broadly based domestic consensus existed and the Japanese Constitution (Article 9) were amended to permit major increases in defense spending, formidable technical problems would confront Japan in developing a strategic nuclear force capable of targeting major Soviet population centers west of the Urals. These caveats notwithstanding, however, the question remains unanswered, and unanswerable, as to whether it will prove possible to have economic and diplomatic multi-

polarity without eventual nuclear multipolarity. Will the major economic powers seek to acquire the most advanced military capabilities, especially if the United States appears no longer able, or willing, to underwrite their security?

In the world of the 1970s, two major triangular relationships have emerged. The first is politico-military and includes the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. The second, an economic triangle, comprises the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. These relationships, and their members, are asymmetrical and unstable. China is far weaker militarily and technologically than the United States or the Soviet Union. The economic strength of Western Europe and Japan is not matched by military strength, and Western Europe and Japan increasingly have become economic competitors of the United States. The 1973 Middle East crisis revealed deep divisions between the United States and its allies in Europe and Japan on foreign policy toward the Arab states and Israel, as well as the difficulties in achieving a harmonization of allied responses or the development of common policies to protect the interests of industrialized, energy-consuming nations faced with unified action by petroleum producers. The economic issues—including energy—separating the United States and its allies hold potential implications for their security relationships. One example is illustrative: a continued divergence of policy on economic and energy issues will make it more difficult to sustain support within the United States for defense commitments to Western Europe and Japan.

Yet only the United States, because of its technological-military-economic strength and its unique diplomatic position vis-à-vis both allies and adversaries, can operate fully within both the U.S.-Soviet-Chinese and the U.S.-West European-Japanese triangular relationships. In recent years the



United States has enjoyed considerably greater success in its diplomacy with the Soviet Union and China than with Western Europe and Japan. While exploiting often to its own advantage the Sino-Soviet rift, the United States has had greater difficulty in its alliance relationships with Western Europe and Japan. It has proven far easier for the United States to negotiate with countries such as the Soviet Union and China, with whom we have relatively limited common interests, than with allies, such as Western Europe and Japan, with whom we face complex problems ranging from defense commitments to energy, trade, technology transfer, and the restructuring of the international monetary system. In contrast to the monolithic decision-making centers of Peking and Moscow, the United States must deal with a variety of national decision-making centers in Western Europe groping slowly for a "European" position in the cumbersome framework of the European Community; and with Europe and Japan the United States deals with governments responsible to electorates and legislatures and subject to a variety of domestic pressures that limit their freedom of action in foreign affairs.

THE PERIOD AHEAD will be characterized by both collaboration and competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. While the Sino-Soviet conflict, together with Soviet trade and technology needs, gives leverage to the United States in its diplomacy with the Soviet Union, important areas of competition persist between the superpowers, as we have seen so vividly in the Middle East.

The Nixon Doctrine and the Brezhnev Doctrine symbolize contrasting and contending approaches to international relations. The Nixon Doctrine postulates an American identity of interest with the emergence

of a more pluralistic international structure based on independent centers of power with which the United States can form "partnerships." The Brezhnev Doctrine calls for Soviet intervention in Communist states in order to prevent change that threatens the rule of existing regimes or appears to jeopardize Soviet interests. The Soviet Union wishes to retard the emergence of the kind of multipolar, pluralistic world upon which the U.S. foreign policy of the Nixon Doctrine is premised. Instead, the Soviet Union prefers a series of weak states in Europe and Asia from which U.S. security guarantees will have been withdrawn. Moscow appears to be pursuing a European diplomacy aimed at the gradual detachment of key powers, such as the German Federal Republic, from Western security arrangements, as well as the dismantling of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Community and the eventual disengagement of the United States from Western Europe. In Asia, the Soviet Union has embarked on a diplomatic effort designed eventually to strengthen Moscow's links with Japan. Ironically, the effect of the 1973 Middle East crisis has been to strain U.S. relations with Western Europe and Japan even more than to enhance the Soviet position with Egypt and other Arab states. The greatest Soviet gains may have been in Europe and Japan rather than in the Middle East itself, for the United States, not the Soviet Union, emerged as the power most able to bring about a disengagement of opposing military forces and prepare for a possible settlement.

If the fundamental premise of the Nixon Doctrine is correct—namely, that a more pluralistic world consisting of additional centers of power in Europe and Asia serves U.S. interests more than those of the Soviet Union—the task of U.S. national security planning is both to encourage the emergence of such a "structure for peace" and

to operate effectively within an existing system in which power has yet to become diffused, except in the economic sector and in diplomacy. As Dr. Kissinger wrote in 1969: "In the years ahead, the most profound challenge to American policy will be philosophical: to develop some concept of order in a world which is bipolar militarily but multipolar politically."<sup>2</sup> However desirable it might be to lessen the defense burdens that the United States has borne for more than a generation—and they should be reduced wherever possible and feasible—the gap between the strength of the United States and other power centers such as Europe and Japan remains vast.

Despite the problems facing the United States in the aftermath of the Middle East war and the use by the Arab states of the "oil weapon," the American economy will probably be affected far less adversely than the economies of Europe and Japan. Even if they are able to minimize the adverse economic effects of higher oil prices and the reduced flow of petroleum, both Europe and Japan will remain highly vulnerable to diplomatic blackmail by oil-producer states so long as they are heavily dependent upon Middle East oil. Not only is their economic strength not matched by military capabilities but the economies of Western Europe and Japan face a period of uncertainty as a result of the Arab oil embargo and domestic inflation. Yet it was largely based upon their economic strength that these states gained a status as power centers in the early 1970s and as potential future military-political actors in the world envisaged beyond this decade. The future strength of Western Europe and Japan will depend, of course, on the availability of energy imports but also on the extent to which new forms of energy can be developed either from technological innovation or the exploitation of offshore oil, such as the North Sea in the case of Western Eu-

rope, and the Sea of Japan, the East China Sea, and the Yellow Sea in the case of Japan.

The basic national security issue facing the United States in the mid-1970s will be to maintain the military strength necessary to serve as a counterpoise to growing Soviet power. In this respect, the United States must possess adequate "bargaining chips" to induce the Soviet Union to enter strategic arms control agreements that limit Soviet weapons programs. We must incorporate into our defense establishment capabilities based on the most advanced technologies. The United States must maintain a defense establishment that is capable of deterring the Soviet Union at both the strategic level and the regional level and, if deterrence fails, of then enabling allies to defend themselves.

The 1973 Middle East crisis is instructive of the intimate relationship between diplomacy and military power—between the "negotiation" and "strength" principles of the Nixon Doctrine. Just after the outbreak of hostilities between Israel and Syria and Egypt, both the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in a series of diplomatic ploys backed by their respective defense capabilities. The Soviet Union resupplied its Arab client states with military equipment and, in an apparent effort to limit U.S. action, hinted at the possibility of airlifting Soviet forces to the Middle East. The United States responded by declaring a full alert of its strategic forces. In addition, the United States deployed a carrier task force to the western Indian Ocean and expanded the capabilities of the Sixth Fleet. The United States initiated a massive airlift of military supplies to Israel in an effort to replace weapons destroyed in the intense fighting on the Golan Heights and in the Sinai. It was the military capabilities of the United States—ranging from strategic nuclear forces, airlift, naval units, and ma-



teriel for "limited war" to the replenishment of Israeli equipment—that provided the "cutting edge" of U.S. diplomacy designed to achieve a cease-fire and create conditions for a political settlement.

In the present era, security is dependent not only on military capabilities but also on the economic strength of the United States and other nations. Economically, the United States faces the formidable task of working with other states to reshape the international economic structure to satisfy the needs of the mid-1970s and beyond. After a generation of unprecedented growth in world trade and prosperity, we have entered a period of uncertainty about future economic relationships. World economic prospects for the future are clouded by the revival of protectionist trade policies, a decline in international liquidity, and recession in industrially advanced nations and in the less developed countries, aggravated by the rising cost of petroleum. The need for collaborative solutions to major economic issues, especially among the United States, Western Europe, and Japan, has been heightened by the Middle East crisis. None of the important economic issues now facing the world community can be solved on a strictly national basis. Yet there is little evidence of a will to embark on bold multilateral initiatives. Secretary of State Kissinger's proposal of December 1973 for a trilateral approach to the solution of the energy crisis, followed by President Nixon's invitation to a meeting of oil-consumer nations and the Washington Energy Conference itself in February, did not lead to a fully unified response, although the communiqué issued at the end of the conference called for creation of an international energy coordinating group.

THE TASK FACING the United States in designing a "structure for peace"

is fraught with great complexity, for in the past there has been no direct and positive relationship between peace and a multipolar international structure. Depending upon the divergence or convergence of interests among its members, a world with several major powers could be more prone to conflict than one based upon two superpowers. Therefore, it will be essential for the United States to retain its military commitment to Europe and Japan, since neither will be prepared or able to assume the principal role in its defense for at least the remainder of this decade. But in return for a reaffirmation of U.S. defense commitments, the United States should seek from its allies a greater level of commitment, tangibly expressed, than in the past. The United States should not be more eager than the ally to provide for that country's defense.

In the Middle East, the United States should continue to support Israel as necessary to secure a balance of power between Israel and the Arab states and should encourage both sides to achieve a more permanent regional settlement in whose preservation all parties will have a stake.

The United States should make an effort to exclude Latin America and Africa from U.S.-Soviet political competition. The growing strength of Brazil will give that rising power a role of unprecedented importance in Latin America. While the United States will be drawn increasingly toward a partnership with Brazil, U.S. diplomacy will face a challenge resulting from rising antipathy among the governments of Spanish-speaking Latin America toward Brazil's newfound status.

Of central importance to the United States in its foreign policy, of course, will be the Soviet-American relationship. The persistence of the Sino-Soviet conflict will confer upon the United States, as it has in recent years, considerable leverage in deal-

ing with both Moscow and Peking. The Soviet need for Western technology and trade will serve to strengthen the U.S. position. But the United States should continue to seek, wherever possible, to maximize diplomatic "linkages" between the various issues in the relationship with the Soviet Union. This means a more adequate understanding of the effects of our trade and technology transfer policy upon our negotiating position in, for example, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Stated differently, the United States should avoid a situation in which trade and technology transfers—for example, in computers and electronics—enable the Soviet Union to remedy its own deficiencies and thereby strengthen its strategic forces, the effect of which is to render more difficult and complex the achievement of U.S.–Soviet strategic arms control agreements.

At the Moscow Summit Conference of June 1972, President Nixon and Secretary Brezhnev signed a Declaration of Principles, declaring that efforts by either superpower "to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly" are inconsistent with the strengthening of "peaceful relations" between them. The joint declaration stressed the need for the United States and the Soviet Union to avoid nuclear war either through direct conflict or as a result of escalation of third-party conflict.

The Middle East conflict sorely tested the principles set forth in the joint declaration. The Soviet Union introduced into the Middle East weapons of unprecedented quantity and quality, which were used by Syrian and Egyptian forces in the Yom

Kippur war. Crucial to the future of the U.S.–Soviet relationship, especially in light of the Middle East crisis, is the extent to which the United States can discourage the Soviet Union from seeking unilateral advantage in regional conflicts. In short, the task facing the United States is to link its overall security relationship with the Soviet Union to specific regional and other issues facing Washington and Moscow. Superpower strategic relationships must not jeopardize, or be isolated from, regional problems. Stability in superpower strategic relationships is incompatible with regional conflict aided and abetted by one of the superpowers.

Here the United States faces an especially difficult problem in its relations with the Soviet Union. Moscow has shown little inclination to eschew policies designed to enhance the Soviet position where the possibility exists for gaining "unilateral advantage." This bespeaks an even more fundamental problem in Soviet-American relations: the extent to which the United States and the Soviet Union share similar, or even compatible, visions of a future global "structure for peace." Is the current phase of U.S.–Soviet relations the beginning of a longer-range trend toward the creation of a more stable international order, or but a passing phase in the Soviet effort to achieve a pre-eminent position in world affairs? Upon the answers to such questions will depend the success or failure of much of U.S. foreign policy in the years ahead, as well as the capacity of the United States to build a new "structure for peace" in whose preservation all nations have a stake.

*Foreign Policy Research Institute*


#### Notes

1. For an analysis of the major assumptions about the international environment upon which U.S. foreign policy in the 1970s is based, see President Richard Nixon, *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s: Building for Peace*

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 25, 1971), pp. 4–5.

2. Henry A. Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy: Three Essays* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969), p. 79.





THE  
TRIAD  
AND BEYOND

*The Future of Strategic Deterrence*

COLONEL ROY L. THOMPSON  
LIEUTENANT COLONEL RALPH N. HOFFMAN, JR.

*Recently there have been a number of studies published regarding strategic nuclear deterrence that have focused on the saving of money with respect to U.S. strategic forces.<sup>1</sup> Although these studies undoubtedly represent a sincere approach to reducing defense costs, they basically tend to address only the cost-saving point of view. The purpose of this article is to explore other perspectives that seem to us to be more reasonable when viewed from a military cost-threat standpoint. In treating this subject, we have focused on Air Force systems and have not attempted to detail the development and employment of sea-launched strategic systems.*

*This article by no means represents a total answer to this very complex question. It is our hope, however, that it will stimulate further thinking and discussion in this vital area of national concern.*

*RLT and RNH, Jr.*

SINCE its inception, the Triad has served the country well by insuring strategic nuclear deterrence. Built on three separate legs—the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the bomber, and the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)—the Triad has worked in a synergistic way to reap deterrent benefits greater than those of the three individual weapon systems. The Triad concept began when total reliance on strategic bombers changed to dependence upon a combination of missiles and bombers, and it evolved during a period in which the United States had unquestioned nuclear superiority.

Today, of course, the strategic situation and needs are changing. We are in a position of strategic parity with the Soviet Union; we have concluded negotiations in the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) and are now engaged in SALT II. In addition to the efforts toward U.S.-U.S.S.R. détente, of which SALT negotiations are a part, there has been a recent trend toward the reordering of our national priorities. This tendency has resulted in increased pressures to reduce

military budgets. Higher personnel and hardware costs add to these budget pressures, and the end result is a force structure reduced in quantity. Moreover, where formerly our strategic objectives placed strong emphasis on assured destruction, the President has called in addition for *flexible strategic* options to provide for strategic sufficiency.

Although an all-out strike by the Soviet Union is the least likely of the nuclear possibilities, it is the most significant in terms of national survival. The priority for our forces to meet this eventuality, of course, is of the first order.

Nevertheless, as the President has noted, there are other possible nuclear threats or provocations that are grave in themselves though on a more limited scale. Our strategic forces should be capable of dealing with such enemy limited nuclear choices in order to maintain a credible deterrence across the entire scale of nuclear contingencies, which can range from the use of a few weapons to an all-out disarming attack.

Thus, the first-priority security need is



to maintain our strategic nuclear forces both to deter against all-out attack and also as the anchor of deterrence against lesser nuclear provocations. This must be done within the quantitative constraints established by the SAL agreements. An even more significant constraint may be cost, not only because of the obviously tightening budget pressures but also for a more subtle reason that concerns deterrence itself.

An overemphasis on the strategic area vis-à-vis conventional power could increase the possibility of an eventual failure of deterrence. In a period of stringent budgets, expenditures for strategic forces of greater than optimum levels or rates could lead to excessive cutbacks in conventional forces. U.S. political and military leverage might then become inadequate at the conventional level to meet possible future challenges to vital national interests, thereby increasing the probability that deterrence may fail at a lower level. And if the U.S. is unable to deal with such failures at the conventional level, there would be an accordant higher probability of escalation to the threat or actual use of nuclear weapons in seeking solutions. This is not to say that under such circumstances the United States would choose to resort to a nuclear solution. It is to say that the lack of adequate conventional capabilities might create an environment for unstable situations in which the U.S. would have but two unsatisfactory options—yield to the conventional challenge or respond with nuclear weapons.

These factors point to what we think is a fresh perception of future strategic deterrent needs, using the best of the Triad rationale as a point of departure. Such a new viewpoint may help illuminate ways of thinking about how best to structure and balance costs of future strategic forces within an overall framework that should permit continued credible deterrence across the warfare spectrum.

### An Integrated Strategic Deterrent System

This perception is one that views future strategic nuclear deterrent needs in terms of an integrated strategic deterrent system. This concept is formed from three basic interwoven ideas: (1) the entity of strategic force, (2) the "weak-link" principle, and (3) mutually supportive strategic subsystems.

#### *strategic entity*

The first idea of this concept is that strategic nuclear forces, regardless of the number of primary subsystems, offer an inseparable total nuclear deterrent when viewed by a potential enemy. For example, should an enemy consider an all-out attack against the United States, he must insure sufficient destruction of the total strategic system, not just one primary subsystem, or risk unacceptable retaliation. On the other hand, should the enemy consider a limited nuclear strike against the U.S., he would have to consider the possibility of a response from any or all of the subsystems within the strategic entity. This perspective of the entity formed by our strategic forces allows for sufficient nuclear deterrence at the all-out level while simultaneously providing for flexible options and hedges to meet a range of lesser nuclear provocations.

The idea of a strategic entity suggests that, like the Triad but in a more pervasive way, it would capitalize on total subsystem strengths and guard against individual subsystem weaknesses without necessarily having to give each subsystem the same degree of capabilities. It is the overall capability of this totality that is critical to the credibility of the future U.S. strategic deterrent; the individual capabilities of the separate subsystems are significant not only in themselves but, more important, for their additive contributions to the totality. This "System" view, however, unlike the Triad,



is not envisaged as limited to three primary subsystems. More will be said on this point later.

*weak-link principle*

The second idea concerns a principle that seems to apply particularly to the planning of future nuclear capabilities. The generally accepted view of military capability was expressed by Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., the former Director of Defense Research and Engineering:

The military capability is made up of a chain of many links—command, control, communication, logistics, trained personnel, weapons and their maintenance, the strategy and tactics to be employed. It is not enough to make any single link overwhelmingly strong. That is why a tenfold improvement in any one military function seldom results in a major overall improvement—unless we are strengthening the weakest link.<sup>2</sup>

Dr. Foster's statement has great validity. In this context, the enemy can probe for and exploit the weak link in conventional military operations. He can do this frequently with relatively little risk, while at the same time such an isolated success might be the key to winning a battle. In planning for nuclear operations, an enemy, there is reason to believe, would be tempted to exploit a weak point in the chain alluded to by Dr. Foster.

This weak-link principle, then, would apply to nuclear deterrence and force capabilities: command, control, and communications must function effectively; logistics and trained personnel must be in place; weapons must operate as planned. The penalty for having a weakness in the strategic arena, however, is so great that it could mean the failure not only of deterrence, loss of a "battle," but of national survival itself. Each link, therefore, must be critically assessed in strategic force plan-

ning. If deterrence should fail, it should not be because an enemy perceives that a successful "low risk" search for our strategic "weak link" is possible.

*mutually supportive strategic subsystems*

The contributions of individual subsystem capabilities in guarding against weak links of the strategic entity can be illustrated by some of the features of our current weapon systems—and the rationale is equally applicable to future systems.

*Survivability.* In terms of current weapon systems, each has some level of and unique features for survivability under all-out attack. For the all-out nuclear situation, these separate features unique to ICBM's, SLBM's, or bombers support each other in ways that ensure a credible retaliatory response of the strategic entity.

For example, an advantage of the on-station U.S. SLBM force is that it would be extremely difficult for any enemy to insure complete and immediate destruction of this subsystem through massive nuclear attack because of its widely spaced operating areas. Although it might be possible for an enemy to neutralize perhaps one or two of our Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines, he could not do so with impunity. In such an event, existence of the other subsystems allows for a range of options appropriate to the level of provocation. It might be pointed out, however, that while an attack on forces at sea is possible, even a small-scale attack would almost certainly not be so severe as to call for the same kind of response as would a strike against our land-based forces.

In other ways, also, sufficient system survivability could be assured because of the mutually supportive subsystems within the integrated deterrent system. For instance, should the Soviet Union contemplate a major attack consisting of simultaneous ICBM and

SLBM impacts, U.S. bombers as well as ICBM's would have ample time to launch due to the advance warning time provided by the Soviet ICBM launch. Conversely, should the Soviets consider the same kind of weapons employment but with simultaneous launch instead of simultaneous impact, U.S. land-based ICBM's would have sufficient escape time. It is this kind of mutual support that is aimed at strengthening the strategic entity under a variety of possible nuclear contingencies.

*Rapid reaction.* Still another example of mutual support is offered by a separate characteristic: reaction time. To illustrate, the Minuteman missile can be launched in one-seventh the time it takes to launch an on-station SLBM. This characteristic adds to our list of possible options—given the quality of U.S. attack assessment capabilities—namely, that rapid reaction time could provide an alternative to launching before the attack arrives. Today, our attack assessment capabilities are far more than simple warning devices; they include accurate and timely attack determination through overlapping and complementary means.

Of course, this option would require the expenditure of a portion of the Minuteman force. Nevertheless, the inherent rapid response of the Minuteman *could* permit launch upon a verified assessment of attack in time to retaliate effectively against the attacker. It is not suggested that launch after assessment become a declared policy, but the actual existence of the capability places a prohibitive uncertainty and deterrent upon a potential enemy. Should he consider a disarming nuclear strike, he could never be certain that the rapid reaction would *not* be exercised.

Because of this rapid reaction option, survivability is strengthened and future economies may be possible. For instance, rapid Minuteman and bomber reaction would appear to give the integrated strategic system

sufficient capability of deterring an enemy who may wish to gamble on a late U.S. response to an attack. Thus, there may be little need to expend scarce funds to achieve an equivalent degree of quick reaction in the sea-launched subsystem.

Given these different unique features of missiles and bombers, there would seem to be little reason to spend limited resources for equivalent capabilities in *all* subsystems for all possible scenarios. For the near term, the quick reaction link of the strategic entity appears sufficient for assuring deterrence.

*Flexibility.* For deterring less than all-out nuclear attacks, flexibility becomes the paramount characteristic of the integrated strategic deterrent system.

A number of facets to flexibility are of importance. Major among these is the need to provide adequate strategic options. This means the ability to select the required capabilities, and not more than the number of weapons needed, for application in less than all-out possibilities. This may mean a few ICBM's, SLBM's, or bombers or some combination of the three. It would seem imperative, however, that whatever subsystems are selected, they be accompanied by positive command and control to insure that the response does not exceed what is necessary. Further, the need for selected subsystems to be highly responsive to positive command and control is a crucial element of flexibility. Such features allow political options (threat of use) as well as selective controlled use of weapons in various ways, with retention of the option of escalating or de-escalating when required.

Within the strategic entity, the manned bomber provides those key advantages beyond missiles that have been often stated: high mobility, posturing, recallability, reusability, damage assessment capabilities. But an additional advantage—one not frequently cited—is the complex U.S. response



options the U.S. bomber force provides to discourage a potential enemy from executing a nuclear attack.

Most notable among the advantages provided by the bomber is insurance in the event of a Soviet breakthrough in defenses against strategic missiles and missile submarines that would jeopardize the U.S. strategic deterrent. Furthermore, the bomber allows for a variety of selective responses to provocations ranging from the threat or employment of nonnuclear to nuclear weapons. Bombers have been combat-tested, to some extent, against sophisticated defenses, and in this respect they provide a relatively high level of confidence in their effectiveness. In addition, bombers permit an extremely complex mix of employment options—in terms of altitudes, speeds, penetration tactics, weapons, and directions of approach—all of which complicate enemy defenses and make them very costly.

In another vein, a further advantage of bombers is that, when deployed in response to a crisis scenario, they make a highly visible force to signal our national determination and resolve to the enemy. When complemented by strategic missiles, the numbers and kinds of strategic options available provide a latitude of selectivity through the interplay of the subsystems that is not possible with only a single subsystem.

Just as rapid reaction provided support to the characteristic of survivability, so can the characteristic of accuracy support flexibility. Current land-based missile and bomber subsystems have the highest degree of strategic weapon accuracy. This characteristic is important where precision in target damage or a wider range of targeting possibilities is desired. Accuracy not only increases system flexibility and the deterrent value of the strategic entity but also permits a broader range of deterrence. Since the accuracies represented by the present land-based systems are extremely high, furth-

er improvements in accuracy of subsystems across the board would probably result in only marginal returns on high investment costs.

These attributes—positive subsystem command and control, rapid reaction, selectability, and accuracy—are the kinds of subsystem capabilities needed for total strategic system flexibility. Though not discussed here, there are other attributes, such as rapid and in-flight retargeting by bombers and the flight speeds of ballistic missiles, that are also important to overall system flexibility.

### The "System" View

This "System" approach, as mentioned earlier, differs from the Triad in several ways. The most obvious difference is that, heretofore, strategic deterrence thinking has focused almost solely on three strategic weapons for "Assured Destruction." The System perspective, on the other hand, allows for the assimilation of whatever future strategic subsystems, and therefore options, are required to provide a sufficient deterrent entity. This view would seem to support the recent statements by Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger concerning "Essential Equivalence."<sup>3</sup>

Second, while the Triad focuses on the deterrence contributions of each element to overall deterrent objectives and relates one element to the other with regard to the total deterrent effect, the System concept *starts* with the "entity" idea, and the totality of strategic deterrence *objectives* determines the additional subsystem capabilities required.

Third, while the Triad is based on the synergistic relationship of the three elements to the performance of the deterrent task and this effect is also recognizable in the System approach, there is explicit recognition in the System approach—as there is not in the Triad—that not all subsystems

need to possess the same capabilities for all tasks. The mutually supporting subsystem capabilities support the totality of strategic deterrent missions.

### The Future of the U.S. Strategic Deterrent

The integrated strategic deterrent system concept provides a basis for viewing possible future strategic subsystem alternatives. In weighing these future alternatives, their design and selection will largely be influenced by cost considerations, the need for new contributions to the total nuclear deterrent system, and hedges against future uncertainties. It may be that current and relatively inexpensive strategic force modernizations cannot continue indefinitely, particularly in the face of changing threats. Eventually, as some subsystems age or face obsolescence, new and advanced subsystems designed against these changing threats will be needed.

One possible new subsystem is an advanced fixed ICBM (AICBM) as a follow-on to the Minuteman or a portion of that land-based missile force. An advantage of the AICBM is that it could be smaller than current ICBM's but have greater throw weight: These new weapons might be placed in current silos and operated in a manner similar to Minuteman. Such improved weapons might be necessary to take advantage of U.S. technological potentials in a variety of areas or to meet new Soviet force improvements. In addition, an AICBM might provide hedges against a wide range of possible, yet unforeseen, future contingencies. For example, in a nuclear scenario in which rapid launch is not crucial, an AICBM that could be operated in a dormant mode could be useful for a delayed response. At the same time, an AICBM that could be operated in a quick reaction mode could be retained for missions calling for a high degree of responsiveness. A small

number of these missiles might be integrated into the Minuteman force, combining into one missile the flexibility required for quick reaction or rapid retargeting capability or dormancy. In the dormant configuration, maintenance might prove to be simpler and less costly than for our current ICBM's.

Another possibility was highlighted in an article that quoted Air Force Lieutenant General Otto Glasser on the air-launched ICBM.<sup>4</sup> Its primary attribute is that it would combine some of the best characteristics of the land-based ICBM with the manned aircraft—characteristics of recallability and positive control, for instance, which might be needed in the future. Development of a subsystem with such capabilities might permit future economies and reductions in other subsystems, depending upon the strategic environment and requirements at that time.

One other possibility lies in the development of an advanced air-launched subsonic strategic cruise missile. This possibility combines the advantages of the manned bomber with some of the key features of strategic missiles but at lower costs than some of the other future strategic subsystem candidates. One of the drawbacks, of course, is that subsonic cruise missiles are subject to relatively high attrition from enemy air defense weapons. This means a continued major role for the manned bomber in tandem with the use of such missiles. For these as well as other reasons, the cruise missile cannot be viewed as a substitute for the unique capabilities possessed by the manned bomber.

A further possibility is a land mobile ICBM, which shares some advantages found in the air-launched ICBM's but to differing degrees. It is mobile and thus could present the enemy with extreme targeting problems, but it also suffers the drawback of being "soft." Another drawback underscored by various lay strategists is that land mobile ICBM's could be very destabilizing, militarily.



Diversities in subsystems—such as the air-launched ICBM and the air-launched strategic cruise missile—can be combined to provide advanced system survivability and flexibility and hedges against future uncertainties in the strategic environment. Diversity also forces the enemy to expend considerably more resources on his strategic defensive systems to cope with ours.

As for more near-term alternatives, the System perspective suggests cost trade-off possibilities between new subsystems and current force modernization. Some of these have been mentioned for the Minuteman, which is the lowest-cost subsystem to provide a given quantity of weapons.

As long as Minuteman remains the most economical force and can be exploited for this feature, more latitude is available in the near term for necessary expenditures on other forces such as those mentioned above for deterrence at the strategic level as well as for conventional forces. The economic latitude permitted by the Minuteman force should reasonably allow the upgrading of the bomber force initially and, once that program is completed, the upgrading or replacement of other subsystems in a sequential manner. This would seem to be an even more attractive approach if one considers the full cost implications of the U.S. intent to maintain a balance of qualitative and

quantitative equivalence in the strategic area.

A NUMBER of contemporary factors have provided the impetus for looking anew at strategic force concepts: increased pressures to reduce military spending, the continued Soviet strategic buildup, new needs for flexibility and options, deterrence across the warfare spectrum, and the fragile environment of détente. Together, these factors point to a new perspective that may offer significant economies in dealing with new strategic and deterrent needs.

As long as strategic deterrence remains our first priority, there will be a pre-eminent and continuing requirement to adjust our strategic concepts in order to meet new challenges adequately. The System view, built as it is on the substantial beginnings offered by the Triad rationale and incorporating the ideas of strategic entity, weak-link principle, and mutually supporting strategic subsystems, seems a reasonable beginning in fulfilling that demand. This approach to viewing future U.S. strategic needs is not, we realize, a *deus ex machina*. However, it is hoped that this perspective will prove useful in guiding the design and tailoring of an adaptable, balanced, and economical future strategic posture in the attainment of Essential Equivalence.

Hq United States Air Force

#### Notes

1. See, for example, the two recent Brookings studies: *Strategic Forces, Issues for the Mid-Seventies* by Alton H. Quanbeck and Barry M. Blechman and *The Next Phase in Foreign Policy*, edited by Henry Owen.

2. Speech by Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., to the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Washington, D.C., 10 January 1973.


3. Speech by Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger to the Overseas Writers Association Club, Washington, D.C., 10 January 1974.

4. Edgar Ulsamer, "M-X: The Missile System for the Year 2000," *Air Force Magazine*, March 1973.



# THE IMPACT OF AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL ATTITUDES ON THE U.S. MILITARY

DR. LLOYD A. FREE



OVER the past eight decades, different cycles and varying attitudes of the American people toward our international role have had their effect on the United States military. One way the influence is noteworthy has to do with the relative weight in determining American policies given at various times to ideals, on the one hand, and self-interest, on the other. In discussing this aspect, I shall draw heavily on a book about the subject, *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations*, written by Dr. Robert E. Osgood, Dean of the School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University, with which the Institute for International Social Research is affiliated.

At the very core of national self-interest, according to Osgood, is normally, of course, the matter of national survival: territorial integrity, political independence, political institutions, and, I would add, way of life. Central to an understanding of basic American outlooks in a historical sense is the fact that from the War of 1812 until the period immediately preceding Pearl Harbor, Americans never really thought they had to worry about their national security. They could perceive no external threat, actual or potential, from any power or combination of powers, to their country's physical safety. This security, they felt, was also reasonably insured for the Western Hemisphere as a whole through the Monroe Doctrine, which, despite earlier threats of encroachment, seemed to be well established internationally by the 1870s.

Feeling secure from menaces from abroad, Americans also took for granted that, so long as they adhered to a policy

of isolation and avoided entangling alliances, another aspect of their national self-interest was also well provided for: "self-sufficiency, or the conduct of foreign relations without reference to other nations or to matters beyond unilateral national control."

Until World War II, Americans felt perfectly safe in pursuing any policies they happened to fancy on the international front, often with little or no awareness of where the country's enlightened self-interest really lay and sometimes with what might be considered a fair degree of irresponsibility.

What motivated them for much of the period were other aspects of national self-interest, particularly the increase of national power, wealth, and prestige. Put very simply, their assumption from the beginning of the Republic was that America was destined to be the greatest nation on earth—the greatest in power, in enlightened institutions, in virtue and morality.

While belief in America's destiny or "mission" could be used to sanctify aggrandizement, it also embodied an idealism transcending the nation's selfish interests. Here, of course, Osgood is referring to "ideals derived from the Christian-liberal-humanitarian tradition of Western Civilization," in which "the ultimate moral standard remains that of the individual's welfare; the instinct for the creation of a brotherhood of man, in which all men, regardless of distinctions, would have equal partnership, and in which human conflicts would be settled by reason, morality and law rather than physical power, coercion

or violence." Coupled with these goals were visions of peace, goodwill, and justice among nations and a "good life," in both the moral and material senses, for the peoples of the world.

In Osgood's view, America's unusual—indeed, almost unique—overall situation permitted Americans to remain ignorant of the realities of international relations during most of their earlier history and to overestimate the role of ideals and underestimate the role of national power and material self-interest.

For added clarification, I would introduce the theory of another outstanding scholar, Dr. Frank L. Klingberg of the University of Southern Illinois. In an article published more than twenty years ago, he advanced the thesis that the international history of our country had been characterized by cycles of alternating moods of introversion and extroversion that had deep emotional support not only by the Administration and Congress in power but by the electorate as well. By "extroversion" he meant the "nation's willingness to bring its influence to bear upon other nations, and to exert positive pressure (economic, diplomatic, or military) outside its borders." During extrovert periods confidence in the "destiny" and influence of America was high, with visions of expansion and extension of American influence abroad. By "introversion" he was referring to periods "when America was unwilling to exert much positive pressure on other nations," constituting years of consolidation and preparation—or, as he put it, "'plateaus' preceding the 'mountain climbs' ahead."

According to Klingberg, who supported his thesis with convincing evidence from the beginning of the Republic, periods of introversion have lasted about two decades on the average, and periods of extroversion about three.

Fusing the insights of Osgood and Kling-

berg is not entirely simple, but some generalized relationships do seem to emerge. Almost by definition, during periods of introversion the role of national power and self-interest has been nonactivist, if not muted. The role of ideals has generally predominated. But the substance of the ideals and the follow-through accorded them have tended to be passivist, quiescent, and nonaggressive. As we shall see in more detail, this was true, for example, during the introverted 1920s when the United States was active on the international front in the search for world peace but refused to take the slightest risk or commit American power to achieve it. During such periods emphasis on the military has been at very low ebb.

During periods of extroversion, on the other hand, far more emphasis has been placed on the role of national power and prestige. And, while the role of ideals has almost invariably continued, the substance of the ideals and behavior in support of them have usually been markedly dynamic, activist, and sometimes even aggressive.

Indeed, the most exalted moods of extroversion have come when such dynamic idealistic notions have served to reinforce and rationalize aggressive policies of national power, self-interest, and aggrandizement, as in the Spanish-American War. During such periods, of course, the American military has really come into its own, particularly when resulting in territorial conquests or war.

This heady combination of power-mindedness and idealism was sometimes dangerous medicine for a fledgling country, but Americans at various times—wrapped, so they felt, in their own security blanket—had little difficulty swallowing it. It is perhaps best summed up in the concept of "manifest destiny," which served to sublimate the old American missionary impulse into the doctrine of the "survival of the fittest"



engendered by Social Darwinism, then applicable to nations and individuals.

A classic statement of this point of view was made by a then relatively obscure Congregationalist minister, Josiah Strong, whose views attained wide currency in 1885, when America was about to emerge from a period of introversion. The religious life of the Anglo-Saxon race, he claimed, was "more vigorous, more spiritual, more Christian than that of any other." The United States was destined to become the seat of Anglo-Saxon power. And there was no doubt that "this race, *unless devitalized by alcohol and tobacco* [italics added], is destined to dispossess many weaker races, assimilate others and mold the remainder, until, in a very true and important sense, it has Anglo-Saxonized mankind."

Urged on by such reasoning, fortified by geopolitical doctrines of power and dynamism of such leaders as Alfred Thayer Mahan and Theodore Roosevelt, America entered a period of extroversion in the 1890s that was highlighted by the expansion of the U.S. Navy, sending the great white fleet around the world, building the Panama Canal, launching military interventions in Latin America in general and Mexico in particular, and, most pertinent, by the Spanish-American War. This war, greeted with great public enthusiasm, was motivated by altruistic idealism, centering on freeing the wretched Cubans from the despotism of the Spaniards, on the one hand, and by extreme egoistic aggrandizement, on the other, which did not abate until the U.S. had seized control even of the faraway islands of the Philippines.

Perhaps the height of irony is found in the history of that most idealistic and moralistic of all our Presidents, Woodrow Wilson. His early approach to international affairs has been summarized by Osgood:

He entered office with an intention to produce a radical reform of foreign policy which

would give America world leadership in standards and policy, lift her diplomacy to the best levels of mankind, cause her to act for the progress of mankind, and advance American ideals rather than contracts of a narrow circle of financiers . . . . He of course regarded morality as a guide in foreign policy and thought moral duties between nations were the same as those within nations, that the United States used moral standards in its judgments, and that all nations were coming to be judged by morality.

Yet, caught up in a period of extroversion, in the course of his administration he found it necessary, as Osgood notes, to carry out more armed interventions in Latin America than any of his predecessors, to impose upon Haiti and the Dominican Republic prolonged military occupations, to invade Mexico, and finally to lead us into World War I, not to "save America" but to "save the world for democracy." It was a war in which Americans, conditioned by Wilson's idealistic verbiage, participated with exalted moral fervor even though they had no real fear for the safety of their own country and continent.

Thus for about three decades, ending at the close of World War I, our society was in a phase of intense extroversion. Then, following the defeat of Wilson's League of Nations initiative, with what seemed an astounding twist, we found ourselves in the alternate phase, a mood of introversion. It was not that Americans ceased to be international-minded. In fact, avoidance of war and preservation of peace were the central theme of American foreign policy during the 1920s. The keynote, however, was cooperation without entangling alliances.

American policy of this period was characterized by such nondynamic, non-aggressive, idealistic moves as two limitation-of-armaments conferences, a severe curtailment in military spending, the effort

to "insulate" the country from war through the Neutrality Acts of 1935-37, and, most symbolic of all, the ridiculous Kellogg-Briand Pact, which purported to outlaw war for all time as an instrument of national policy!

Despite the repugnance to American idealism of Nazism and Fascism, the U.S. failed to react except verbally to the rise and increasing aggressiveness of the Fascist and Nazi regimes. It refused to cooperate with the League of Nations in levying sanctions when Italy invaded Ethiopia. It failed to budge when the Japanese went berserk first in Manchuria and later in China proper, despite America's close historical ties with the Chinese. And so it went: the posture was passivist, the mood deeply introverted.

The disillusionment of the times with the activist international role the United States had played in the past was exemplified in 1937 by a Gallup poll finding that no less than 70 percent of those with an opinion felt it had been a mistake for the United States to enter World War I.

Typical of the mood of passivism which had seized the country was another Gallup poll in mid-1938, when apprehension about Axis intentions was already running high. While almost seven out of ten Americans favored a world disarmament conference, almost two-thirds opposed the idea of President Franklin Roosevelt's taking the initiative in calling such a conference. (Shades of Teddy Roosevelt!) In the eyes of Americans of that day, in short, world leadership and responsibility involving anything in the way of burdens, risks, or commitments for the United States were to be avoided at almost all costs.

After about two decades of introversion and isolationism, which had been immeasurably deepened by the Great Depression, a gradual shift began on the eve of Pearl Harbor. On the one hand, for the first time

since the War of 1812 Americans began to suspect that their own national security and self-sufficiency might, after all, be involved in the outcome of the war in Europe—a true turning point in the history of American thought. In the second place, our heretofore quiescent idealism began to become more dynamic in the feeling that the cause of freedom, as represented by Great Britain, must not be allowed to be crushed through the might of the Nazis, Fascists, and militaristic Japanese. Idealism and self-interest thus joined to move America toward intervention. While the desire to stay out of the war continued, sentiment for increased aid to Britain, at ever increasing risks for the United States, rose sharply as time went on.

The ambivalences of the public mood during the last weeks preceding Pearl Harbor are evident in some of Gallup's major findings. Interviews concluded less than a week before the Japanese attack showed that, while about one-quarter thought not, slightly more than one-half of Americans expected that "the United States will go to war against Japan sometime in the near future." In short, from a historical review, it appears probable that, even if the Japanese had not taken the initiative, the American public would soon have endorsed the U.S. entering the war anyway. Thus, in the period preceding Pearl Harbor, Americans were shifting gradually from their prior mood of introversion to the mood of exuberant extroversion that characterized this country during World War II and for well over two decades thereafter.

And what a binge we went on in the postwar period—at least until the Russians took some of the wind out of our sails by acquiring the bomb and launching their Sputniks. We conceived of ourselves as the most powerful, the richest nation since the Creation, our system as the model that every other country should follow.



We saw a menace, not only to America itself but to human freedom everywhere, in what we then conceived of as monolithic Communism, and we girded up to fight the Cold War. Not only our national self-interest but our national security were considered to be involved in every part of the globe—eventually even in faraway Vietnam. It was clearly our manifest destiny to run and protect the Free World, more especially to save it not so much *for* democracy as *from* Communism. Our idealism again took on a dynamic, aggressive character, which can best be denominated by the somewhat negative term, *anti-Communism*. The positive aspect of this idealism was perhaps best expressed in President John F. Kennedy's inaugural speech of 1961: "Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe *to assure the survival and success of liberty.*"

Except for temporary military alliances during times of war, our joining of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 had been our first "entangling alliance" since the founding of the Republic. This was followed, during the Dulles era, by a spree of "pactomania." In our own eyes, the U.S. had become the self-appointed policeman of the world and the guardian of all humanity.

During this period, faced by the Communist menace, the American military enjoyed its greatest heyday, totally out of proportion to what had ever happened before in peacetime, not only in the resources it could command but in its unprecedented influence on both strategic matters and foreign policy generally.

Then (coincidentally or not) after it had become apparent that America's vast military power had been effectively stymied by a small Asian nation in Indochina, some-

thing began to happen at just about the time that Klingberg fifteen years earlier had predicted that it would: after the mid-sixties Americans began turning inward again toward a mood of at least somewhat greater introversion. A majority of the public began to feel it had been a mistake for us to get involved in Vietnam. Subsequently, the new President, undoubtedly responsive to the changing mood of the public, began our withdrawal from Vietnam and announced the Nixon Doctrine, postulating a continuing role for the United States abroad but a sharp reduction in our overextended commitments.

And what transpired a bit later? Why, the most confirmed Cold Warrior of them all manifestly reduced international tensions by making "peace" first with Communist China and then with the Soviet Union. (Shades of the China Lobby and the "kitchen debate"! ) And how did the American public, which for so many years had exhibited both extreme extroversion and an anti-Communist syndrome, react? They ate it up.

And where do we stand now? So far, the answer seems to be that Americans have by no means swung over to the outright type of isolationism that characterized this country from the end of World War I to the beginning of World War II. But there has been a distinct watering down of the stalwart internationalism that permeated the nation for more than two decades after the war.

The recent situation is shown most clearly in a public opinion survey of a national cross section of more than 1800 cases commissioned by Potomac Associates and written up in a book entitled *State of the Nation* that William Watts and I put together. With a formula my Institute had used twice before, a battery of questions was prepared

to rank members of the sample on a scale ranging from completely or predominantly internationalist to predominantly or completely isolationist, with an in-between category labeled "mixed" (meaning a mixture of internationalist and isolationist patterns). Here are the successive results for 1964, 1968, and finally 1972.

**International Patterns**

|                                | 1964 | 1968 | 1972 |
|--------------------------------|------|------|------|
| Completely internationalist    | 30%  | 25%  | 18%  |
| Predominantly internationalist | 35   | 34   | 38   |
| Mixed                          | 27   | 32   | 35   |
| Predominantly isolationist     | 5    | 6    | 5    |
| Completely isolationist        | 3    | 3    | 4    |
|                                | 100% | 100% | 100% |

It will be noted that the percentage of isolationists, whether predominant or complete, remained very small throughout. However, the proportion of those who were "completely internationalist" was almost halved between 1964 and 1972, with the "predominantly internationalist" category and, even more significantly, the "mixed" category (half-way toward isolationism) both increasing.

The most significant factor associated with these shifts was growing sentiment that less emphasis should be put on international matters and more on national problems here at home. The responses to several of the questions will illustrate.

**Domestic Concerns**

*We shouldn't think so much in international terms but concentrate more on our own national problems and building up our strength and prosperity here at home.*

|            | 1964 | 1968 | 1972 |
|------------|------|------|------|
| Agree      | 55%  | 60%  | 73%  |
| Disagree   | 32   | 31   | 20   |
| Don't know | 13   | 9    | 7    |
|            | 100% | 100% | 100% |

It will be noted that the proportion of those agreeing that greater emphasis should be placed on domestic matters rose from 55% in 1964 to 60% in 1968 and to 73% in 1972. Clearly, this trend indicated a

turning inward on the part of Americans, reflecting a sharp increase in concern, both relatively and in absolute terms, about the problems that face this country here at home as contrasted with the international scene.

Also highly indicative of the lessening power of extroversion are the ways reactions have changed in the case of two following statements that Watts and I put to our *State of the Nation* cross section in 1972, which I had previously used in my 1964 and 1968 Institute studies:

**Dominant Position**

*The U.S. should maintain its dominant position as the world's most powerful nation at all costs, even going to the very brink of war if necessary.*

|            | 1964 | 1968 | 1972 |
|------------|------|------|------|
| Agree      | 56%  | 50%  | 39%  |
| Disagree   | 31   | 40   | 50   |
| Don't know | 13   | 10   | 11   |
|            | 100% | 100% | 100% |

As will be noted, in 1964 a majority of the public agreed with the thesis that the U.S. should maintain its position as the world's most powerful nation at all costs. By 1972 that view was held by less than four in ten, with one-half expressing disagreement. (This, in itself, of course, is a reflection of changing views about the importance of American military might.)

**Containment**

*The United States should take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to prevent the spread of Communism to any other part of the free world.*

|            | 1968 | 1972 |
|------------|------|------|
| Agree      | 57%  | 46%  |
| Disagree   | 29   | 43   |
| Don't know | 14   | 11   |
|            | 100% | 100% |

Between 1968 and 1972 the two-to-one majority sentiment for the U.S. taking all necessary steps to contain Communism had dissipated into virtual stalemate.

The present outlook is well summed up by the overwhelming agreement accorded



the following statement, which in highly simplistic fashion outlined the essence of the still vaguely defined Nixon Doctrine:

*The U.S. should continue to play a major role internationally, but cut down on some of its responsibilities abroad.*

A remarkable 87 percent agreed.

Despite this turning inward and consequent watering down of earlier outright internationalism, it is of particular importance to the American military that no general mood of pacifism or sweeping repudiation of our belligerent past has gripped the country as yet. Americans today are highly selective in their views about the wars we have been involved in, as shown by several questions the Institute commissioned the Gallup organization to ask late in 1972. For instance:

#### Pacifism

*Do you think it was a good thing the U.S. took part in (name of war), or do you feel it would have been better if we had managed to stay out?*

|            | World War I | World War II | Korea | Vietnam |
|------------|-------------|--------------|-------|---------|
| Good thing | 61%         | 78%          | 37%   | 24%     |
| Stay out   | 20          | 13           | 49    | 69      |
| Don't know | 19          | 9            | 14    | 7       |
|            | 100%        | 100%         | 100%  | 100%    |

In contrast to the large majority that in 1937 said it was a mistake for the U.S. to have entered World War I, more than six out of ten now think it was a good thing that we took part in that war, and a huge majority amounting to almost eight out of ten feel the same way about World War II.

On the other hand, a large plurality now feels that it would have been better if we had stayed out of the Korean War, and a huge majority amounting to almost seven out of ten thinks our involvement in Vietnam was an error.

There were, of course, significant differences between the two World Wars, on the one hand, and the Korean and Vietnam Wars, on the other. The former, for one

thing, were big wars in which the U.S. and its allies won clear-cut, sweeping victories. For another, far more Americans now living observed at first or second hand the confusion, muck, and costs in lives and money of the Korean and Vietnam affairs than of the earlier world wars. In historical retrospect, the world wars, perhaps in part because of distance in time, retain a greater measure of idealism and even nobility, whereas many Americans today, no doubt, are not really clear in their own minds what we were fighting for in Korea or Vietnam, what vital interests or purposes of ours were involved, or what we were trying to or did in fact accomplish.

As a final step in giving some greater perspective as to the impact on the U.S. military of changes in Americans' international attitudes, we have prepared a table on defense expenditures over the last eight decades. Rather than expressing these in terms of constant dollars, we came to the conclusion that the most meaningful way to indicate them would be as percentages of total gross national product (GNP). This gives an idea of how much of a slice of the total national pie America has been willing during various fiscal years to devote to the military services. (The table is not entirely exact because the figures available on defense expenditures are on a fiscal year basis while the GNP figures are for calendar years, but the thrust of the comparisons is not seriously affected by this discrepancy.)

Let's look first at the percentages of GNP devoted to defense expenditures from fiscal 1889 through fiscal 1939. During these years, when there was no concern about the national security of the U.S. homeland, the figures were consistently low. They rose only during the two wars of that period: the Spanish-American War and World War I. It is further evident that no significant preparedness was undertaken in

**Annual Defense Expenditures**

*As Percentage of GNP*

|           |                      |      |
|-----------|----------------------|------|
| 1889-1897 |                      | .6   |
| 1898-1899 | Spanish-American War | 1.4  |
| 1900-1915 |                      | 1.0  |
| 1916      |                      | .7   |
| 1917      |                      | 1.0  |
| 1918-1919 | World War I          | 11.0 |
| 1920-1939 |                      | 1.1  |
| 1940      |                      | 1.5  |
| 1941      |                      | 4.8  |
| 1942-1945 | World War II         | 30.8 |
| 1946      |                      | 20.5 |
| 1947-1950 |                      | 5.0  |
| 1951-1954 | Korean War           | 11.5 |
| 1955-1964 |                      | 9.5  |
| 1965-1966 |                      | 7.8  |
| 1967-1970 | Vietnam War          | 9.0  |
| 1971      |                      | 7.7  |
| 1972      |                      | 6.0  |
| 1973      |                      | 6.1  |

the way of military buildup in advance of either of these wars.

As for World War I, by which time our leaders should have known better, the percentage of GNP devoted to defense in fiscal 1916, after the war in Europe had been going on for two years, dropped significantly below the average for 1900-1915; and in 1917, on the eve of our own involvement, it only came back up to the earlier low level. Then immediately after the war had ended, it dropped from the average level of 11.0% during the war to about where it had been during the prewar days between 1900 and 1915 (1.1%).

After World War II started in Europe, because this time the national security of the United States was considered potentially at stake, there was at least some significant buildup in advance of Pearl Harbor. In fiscal 1940 the percentage of GNP devoted to defense went up from the earlier average of 1.1% to 1.5%; and in 1941, just before Pearl Harbor, it actually rose to 4.8%. Then, of course, came the astronomical average of 30.8% during the war years.

But after a period of demobilization in 1946, the average in the three years before we became involved in Korea went back down again to 5.0%.

Korea actually boosted the defense expenditure rate in terms of GNP to one-half of a percentage point above where it had been during World War I. But, leaving aside the period of the war in Vietnam, let's see what happened following Korea: from 1955 to 1964 the average was 9.5%; in 1965-1966 it dropped to 7.8%; then, after Vietnam, it dropped further in 1971 to 7.7%; and in 1972 it dropped to 6.0%, with only a statistically insignificant rise in 1973 to 6.1%.

So, except for the increased outlays necessitated by the Vietnam War, the trend in defense expenditures as a percentage of GNP has been consistently downward since 1964—still far above the average before World War II, of course, but nevertheless ever downward.

This reflects, I suppose, the lessened sense of menace felt by both the American people and their leaders, and it is probably another indication of the shift in our society from a mood of stalwart extroversion to one of somewhat more introversion.

But what about the future? To start with, there may be no generalized feelings of pacifism in this country yet, at least. Nevertheless, encouraged by President Nixon's and Secretary Kissinger's high-level diplomacy, a comfortable feeling of détente appears to be seeping increasingly into the veins of the American people. According to a recent Harris poll, for example, almost 7 out of 10 Americans now believe that the U.S. and the Soviet Union can reach long-term agreements to help to keep the peace.

Despite the continuing, frightening Soviet military buildup during recent years, which is more gigantic and sustained than ever carried out before by any world power in time of peace, many Americans and



most of our allies have increasingly lost the sense of any imminent menace from abroad. And, most seriously, substantial and sustained support has developed at the popular level, despite the position of the Administration and many members of the House and the Senate, for cutting defense expenditures. A growing percentage of the public, amounting to more than one-half of those with an opinion on the subject, now feel we are spending too much on defense.

In conclusion, taking all this into account, where in an overall sense do we—America and Americans—stand today? Despite the Nixon Doctrine and the current relaxation in international tensions, the United States continues to play an enormous though reduced role in world affairs—on the whole with the approval of the American public. Despite the present tendency to turn inwards toward domestic problems and, relatively speaking, de-emphasize international matters, at this stage Americans as a whole are still far from the thoroughgoing isolationism of pre-World War II days. In short, we as a country are well below the summit of activism and extroversion that we attained in the years after World War II, but we are still far, far above the deep valley of isolationism we lived in between the wars.

The present mood cannot be characterized as either one of sustained extroversion or, as yet, one of clear introversion. But it is almost certain that we shall witness at least some further drift toward introversion before reaching one of those "plateaus" Klingberg talked about.

I would, of course, like to hope that we

are entering a period of a more moderate, stable outlook and stance of enlightened self-interest toward America's place and role in the world than what has characterized the extremes in the periods of both introversion and extroversion during the last eight decades. But, as with so many things in our national life at the present time, we can only wait for the future to tell.

We are, in short, in a period of transition, if not of temporary dormancy. With our potential enemies defanged, in the eyes of the public, through a most uncertain and unpredictable *détente*, with our relations with former friends and allies, especially the Western Europeans and Japanese, now cool and distant, we find ourselves as a people possessing a dimmed sense of national purpose, of national self-interest, and even of national ideals (whether in the active or passive form)—except perhaps those who feel strongly about the Israeli cause or the emigration of Jews out of Russia. In short, we lack for the moment a sense of basic guidelines in international affairs.

If I were a military man or connected with the Defense Establishment today, I would see little grounds for optimism. Nor would I yet feel entirely pessimistic. But to tell you the truth, just as a plain, ordinary American citizen, I personally feel extremely uneasy for the time being about where America is likely to go.

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In preparing this article I have had extensive assistance from Dr. Arthur W. John, Research Associate for The Institute for International Social Research.

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## THE OCTOBER WAR

### *A Political-Military Assessment*

CAPTAIN BARD E. O'NEILL

**I**N 1972 President Anwar as-Sadat of Egypt, frustrated by the failure of Arab diplomatic efforts to dislodge the Israelis from areas occupied in the 1967 war, told his people that a “battle of destiny” would have to be waged against Israel. Although the Arabs greeted Sadat’s words with general approval, within a year their enthusiasm had begun to dissipate. Reacting to



the lack of follow-up action, they began not only to question Sadat's credibility but to ridicule him. By the beginning of 1974 all this had changed, and today Sadat is viewed as a hero in the Arab world. In fact, in the eyes of some Arabs he has surpassed the late Gamal Abdel Nasser in prestige. The reason for this dramatic change was, of course, the war of October 1973.

It is the purpose of this article to examine the war briefly in terms of its political-psychological background, the objectives of both sides, the results, and the chances for peace.

### The Political-Psychological Background

To understand this October War, one has to go back to the summer of 1967 when the Arabs, surveying the political and military wreckage wrought by the Six-Day War, found their armies broken and defeated and over one million brethren in the Sinai, Gaza Strip, West Bank, and Golan Heights under Israeli occupation. Besides the territorial and population losses, the Arabs had suffered a profound psychological setback in that they felt they had been humiliated and dishonored.

Thus, when the Arab rulers, kings and presidents, met at the summit in Khartoum in the late summer of 1967, they made it clear that nothing less than the return of all the occupied areas would be satisfactory. Moreover, they agreed that there would be no negotiations with Israel, no recognition of Israel, and no settlement with Israel.<sup>1</sup> From that time onward Arab leaders scrupulously adhered to the pursuit of their goal, with Presidents Nasser and then Sadat stating time and again that "not one inch" of Arab land could remain in Israeli hands, a position that not even the most flexible of Israeli plans could accommodate.

In Israel, meanwhile, the issue of the

occupied areas generated substantial political controversy between 1967 and 1973. On the political right, the Gahal Party and the Greater Israel Movement argued that the occupied areas should be retained, not only because they enhanced security but also because they were part of the biblical land of Israel. The right-wing view, however, lacked widespread support and thus had little impact on official policy.<sup>2</sup> Far more important, as far as government policy was concerned, were the plans put forth by Moshe Dayan, Pinhas Sapir, and Yigal Allon.

Dayan favored the economic integration of a large part of the West Bank, the Arab half of Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Hebron with Israel, while Sapir proposed returning most of the West Bank to Jordan so as to free Israel from the burden of ruling a large Arab population. One of Sapir's fears was that an eventual incorporation of the West Bank would pose a demographic threat to the Jews, given the Arabs' higher birth rate. In time, he argued, an Arab majority would emerge, which would threaten Israel's survival.<sup>3</sup>

Even though it was never given official approval by the government, it was the Allon plan that seemed to enjoy the most support. Allon's scheme represented an attempt to reconcile the demographic dilemma with Israel's perceived security needs. The security issue was, as might have been expected, a dominant consideration in policy-making. Israeli military leaders were quick to point out that Israel's security situation had been vastly improved as a result of the war. Before the outbreak of hostilities, Israel had seen Egypt mobilize its army in the Sinai and close the Strait of Tiran to Israeli shipping; large portions of Israel were vulnerable to Jordanian artillery attacks from the West Bank; and settlements were shelled by Syria from the Golan Heights. After the conflict, all

major population centers and ninety percent of Israel's farms were out of artillery range, the new borders were shorter and more defensible, and Israel had acquired defense in depth.<sup>4</sup>

In light of the favorable strategic changes, Israeli political leaders made it clear that a return to the *status quo antebellum* would not be acceptable. As Foreign Minister Abba Eban put it:

Never shall Syrian guns terrorize our villages in Upper Galilee and the Jordan Valley, never shall Egyptian forces a few miles away from our major cities stick their finger into our very throat, never shall hostile armies press against us in a narrow coastal strip.<sup>5</sup>

Since Israel's top political leaders were in agreement that security imperatives would rule out the return of all the occupied areas, the issue then shifted to the question of which regions were expendable.

According to the Allon formulation most of the occupied areas and Arab population would revert to Arab control, thus freeing Israel from the demographic albatross around its neck. At the same time, however, provision was made to retain a number of security gains. Specifically, the Allon plan called for a 10- to 15-mile-wide security belt along the sparsely populated edge of the Jordan River, which would be considered Israel's new military border. Protected by a string of paramilitary settlements, on what would be considered Israeli territory, the strip would contain fewer than 20,000 Arabs. New towns were to be built to overlook the cities of Jericho and Hebron, and a 4.3-mile-wide corridor linking Jordan with the West Bank was envisaged. With the exception of Jerusalem and areas near Latrun and Hebron, the rest of the area outside the paramilitary strip, containing most of the Arab population, would be given an autonomous status or be linked with Jordan, depending on negotiations with the latter. Finally, the

Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan would be asked to accept 200,000 refugees from Gaza.

Outside the West Bank, Allon's scheme called for a demilitarized Sinai and a new Israeli town near Sharm al-Sheikh, which would guard a north-south line to Al-'Arish representing the Israeli withdrawal area. Besides providing defense against conventional attacks—the Jordan River is a natural tank ditch—the Allon plan, with its paramilitary settlements, was also directed at the problem of guerrilla infiltration.<sup>6</sup>


The influence of the Allon plan was clearly evident in the Israeli settlement pattern between 1969 and 1973. By the end of January 1971 the building of gas stations, hotels, and tourist facilities at Sharm al-Sheikh seemed to suggest that the Israelis intended to retain that key strategic point. In the Golan Heights, meanwhile, 9 of the 11 settlements that had been constructed were civilian, a development which also implied a permanent presence.<sup>7</sup>

The settlement pattern along the West Bank likewise reflected Tel Aviv's strategic outlook. In this case, however, there were five paramilitary settlements and but two civilian settlements. Both the location of the paramilitary settlements along the Jordan River and the fact that civilian settlements (with the notable exception of two fledgling Jewish communities near Hebron) were not encouraged seemed compatible with the idea of returning most of the West Bank area and population to Arab control.

In Gaza, which the Israelis had pledged not to return to Egypt, a new Israeli civilian settlement a few miles from the Strip was thought by some to be the beginning of a defensive chain of settlements around Gaza. The implication was that when Israel returned the Sinai to Egypt it would probably ask for some marginal frontier changes in the north.<sup>8</sup> In sum, it seemed that Israel was committed to return



*Sadat, believing he was victorious, paraded triumphantly through Cairo.*



most of the occupied areas, with the exception of points along the Jordan River, Sharm al-Sheikh, Golan, Gaza, and East Jerusalem.

The official position of the Israeli leadership, reinforced by the unofficial implementation of the Allon plan, was incapable of being reconciled with the Arab demand that all the occupied areas be returned. This basic contradiction was the rock upon which several diplomatic efforts between 1967 and 1973 foundered.

In the spring of 1973 Sadat's frustration with the immobilism in the diplomatic arena appeared to deepen. In April he warned:

Everyone has fallen asleep over the Mideast crisis. . . . The time has come for a shock. Diplomacy will continue before, during and after the battle. The Arabs will never be defeated. . . . They are occupying territory in three Arab countries. Let's see if they can stay like this. I say they can't. And you will soon see who is right.<sup>9</sup>

Arab skepticism about the ability or will of the United States and the Soviet Union to change the situation was reinforced several weeks later when President Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev met at the summit and endorsed détente between the superpowers. As a result of that event, Arab politicians, strategists, and writers began an extensive analysis of Egyptian-Soviet relations and produced a spate of documents and official assessments focusing on the impact that improved Soviet-American relations would have on the Arab quest to get back the occupied areas.

On July 23 Sadat delivered a major address to a combined session of the Central Committee of the Arab Socialist Union and the People's Assembly, during which he summarized the Egyptian view of the state of Soviet-Egyptian relations. He acknowledged that, while the Soviet Union was an indispensable ally of the Arabs, its global role would preclude its decisively support-

ing them in their attempt to reacquire the occupied areas. To compensate, he stressed the need to build Egypt's "intrinsic strength" and to mobilize Arab resources.<sup>10</sup> Accordingly, in the next several weeks Sadat undertook an effort to broaden his support in the Arab world by strengthening relations with Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Jordan. At the same time he tried to avoid a complete break with Libya's Muammar al-Qaddafi, who not only was vehemently opposed to Kings Hussein and Faisal (of Jordan and Saudi Arabia respectively) but was stung by Egypt's standoff attitude toward his desire to merge with Egypt. One of the objectives of the intensified Egyptian diplomatic effort within the Arab world was to bring the "oil weapon" into the battle with Israel, an undertaking that proved eminently successful.

While focusing its attention on the Arab world, Cairo did not neglect the opportunity to gain the backing of the non-aligned countries, especially those in Africa. At the Fourth Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Non-aligned Countries in Algiers in September, the Arabs were successful in obtaining a resolution endorsing their goal of reacquiring the occupied areas.<sup>11</sup> But the real payoff from Arab diplomacy came during the October War, when almost every state in Black Africa severed relations with Israel and the majority of Third World nations supported the Arab position. When the cutback on Arab oil production led Japan and the European Economic Community (Holland excepted) to endorse the Arab demands, the isolation of Israel was virtually complete (with the notable exception of the United States).

During the period of military, diplomatic, and economic preparation for the conflict with Israel, Egypt had not given up hope that peaceful change could be brought about. Sadat apparently had been persuaded

by some of his advisers that the appointment of Henry Kissinger as United States Secretary of State might alter American policy. The reasoning was that, as a Jew, Kissinger could exert pressure on Israel to make concessions without being branded as anti-Semitic. When, from the Arab viewpoint, Kissinger failed to communicate any such intention during his United Nations speech of September 24, the Arabs reached the conclusion that there was little possibility U.S. policy would change and soundly condemned the circles that argued it would.<sup>12</sup>

One reason the Arabs had exhibited such interest in Kissinger's United Nations speech may have been the hardening of Israel's position on the occupied areas, which was manifest in the Labor Party's support of the Gallili Document in early September. After a sharp debate, the Labor Party, which was preparing for the scheduled October elections, had decided to support Dayan's demands for a town near the Rafah area (to be populated by immigrants), more civilian settlements in the occupied areas, and the right of the Jewish Development Agency to buy Arab land. To the Arabs this was just more evidence that Israel did not intend to return the occupied areas.<sup>13</sup>

Thus, on the eve of the October War Sadat found himself in a situation where peaceful change was perceived as unlikely. But, as pointed out above, the Egyptian president had achieved notable diplomatic success in the Arab world and had, at least for the moment, created a sense of unity among the Arab states. Knowing that such unity would undoubtedly be ephemeral, Sadat may have felt compelled to act before the Arabs reverted to the more normal pattern of bickering among themselves. Finally, it should be noted that both Sadat and President Hafez al-Assad in Syria had to consider their own precarious situations.





*General Moshe Dayan, Israeli defense minister and military leader in the Six-Day War, again led his country in battle.*

Besides being under pressure from domestic "hawks," the Egyptian president had to face the fact that by not fulfilling his promise to wage the "battle of destiny" against Israel he was seriously eroding his credibility. In Syria, meanwhile, Assad's position seemed even weaker. As a member of the minority Alawite sect, he was already suspect in the eyes of the Sunni majority, particularly after an aborted attempt by his Baathist government to gain approval for a constitution that did not explicitly acknowledge Islam as the official state religion. To act decisively against Israel was one way of diverting attention from domestic difficulties and establishing at least a modicum of popular support for the regime.

While all these domestic and political factors help explain the outbreak of war on October 6, 1973, the picture would not be complete without mention of the psychological context. Honor and dignity having a special place in the Arab culture, the debacle of 1967 had become a source of deep humiliation and shame that had to be

redressed. Hence, on October 6 President Assad echoed the feelings of Arabs everywhere when, in a nationwide broadcast to his Syrian countrymen, he stressed not the battle against Zionism, imperialism, or Jews but the "battle of honor and dignity."<sup>14</sup>

Although their need to redeem their honor was a psychological factor underlying the resort to violence, the Arabs' long-term goal of regaining the occupied areas was undoubtedly the key motivation. There is little evidence to support the notion that Cairo and Damascus believed they could accomplish this goal immediately or easily. Rather, the strategy appeared to emphasize the intermediate objectives of retaking and holding part of the Sinai and Golan Heights, inflicting heavy human and material losses on Israel, and heightening the concern of the major powers with conditions in the region.<sup>15</sup> All these objectives, if achieved, would, the Arabs reasoned, change the situation dramatically by initiating a diplomatic process that would end with Israeli withdrawal from the occupied areas. A territorial victory, however small, would not only instill confidence in the Arabs but force the Israelis to reconsider the idea that territory would provide security. In conjunction with this, the Arabs believed that by inflicting heavy losses on the Israeli Defense Force and by subjecting the Israeli economy to severe strain they could force Israel to make concessions.<sup>16</sup> Finally, the Arabs hoped that, by raising fears of a superpower confrontation and by withholding oil supplies, they could compel the West, especially the United States, to bring pressure to bear on Tel Aviv to reach a settlement satisfactory to the Arab side.

#### Results of the War

To nearly everyone's surprise, the Arabs, during the first several days, achieved nota-



The Egyptians, now well trained, equipped by the Soviets with ultramodern armament, and inspired after six years of determination to erase their 1967 humiliation, captured their first Israeli prisoners on 6 October 1973.

ble military success as they took advantage of Israel's lack of preparedness and their own improved military capabilities. In terms of the latter, the numerically superior Arab armies made effective use of their integrated air defense systems (anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles) and anti-tank missiles. Unfortunately for the Arabs, the time they took to consolidate their bridgeheads on the east bank of the Suez Canal eventually cost them the initiative.<sup>17</sup> After locating a weak point at the juncture of the Second and Third Egyptian Armies, Israeli tank columns, led by Major General Ariel Sharon, surprised the Egyptians by crossing the canal and proceeding to cut off the rear of the Third Corps of the Third Egyptian Army, the southern bridgehead.<sup>18</sup> Had it not been for superpower intervention and the cease-fire of October 23, it is likely that the Israeli penetration force would have cut off the rear of the Second Army as well and thus completed the defeat of the Egyptian forces. (The Syrian forces, after costly and bitter fighting, had already been pushed to a point halfway between the Golan Heights and Damascus.) The possibility of a com-

plete rout of the Egyptian forces was undoubtedly why the Soviets threatened to intervene and why Sadat actively sought a cease-fire resolution at the United Nations.

As things turned out, not only did the Egyptian Army avoid a defeat but the Arabs came to believe that they had won a military victory because they had been able to hold their east bank positions. In fact, when the disengagement agreement was reached in January, the outcome of the conflict was a territorial gain for Egypt. In Syria, on the other hand, the Arabs could hardly claim victory, since Israel had substantially increased its territorial control.

### Prospects for Peace

Paradoxically, the fact that the Israelis had been unable to achieve their objective of restoring the *status quo antebellum* may, over the longer term, work to Israel's benefit, if it enables the Arabs to make the concessions necessary for a peace settlement. Whereas prior to the war the Arabs eschewed negotiations with Israel because they wished to avoid coming to the conference table as defeated supplicants, after



the war they could afford to negotiate with the Israelis (albeit under United Nations auspices and through the United States government) because they felt they had redeemed their honor. However, whether the Arabs' perception of having won a victory has created a sense of magnanimity sufficient to enable them to make some territorial concessions is, as of this writing, not clear. One thing certain is that it will take patient and skillful diplomacy to overcome the formidable obstacles remaining in the way of a peace settlement. Unhappily, the Arabs and Israelis remain far apart when it comes to negotiating the status of the Golan Heights and the West Bank of the Jordan River, including Jerusalem. Although Egypt and Israel may be able to reach an agreement on a phased Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai in return for Egypt's restoration of the canal and its cities along the canal, Cairo is under great pressure in the Arab world not to settle unilaterally with Israel. Rather, Egypt is expected to support the demand that Israel withdraw from the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights.

In terms of the Golan Heights, Israel remains sensitive to security needs and to the demands of Jewish civilians who have settled there. In fact, on February 8 Premier Golda Meir publicly pledged not to return the Golan to Damascus.<sup>19</sup> As far as the West Bank is concerned, Israel and all the Arab states, including of course Jordan, are divided over

the status of Jerusalem and Israeli demands for military outposts along the Jordan River. Further complicating the West Bank issue is the Arab policy, articulated at the Arab summit in Algiers after the war, that the Palestine Liberation Organization (umbrella structure for most of the various Palestinian guerrilla organizations) is the official representative of the Palestinian people.<sup>20</sup> Although the guerrillas have made it clear that they will not accept a return of the West Bank to Jordan, they are divided over the question of whether or not they should accept a Palestinian state made up of the West Bank and/or Gaza. Even if they were in agreement, however, it might be academic, since Israel has said that it will neither negotiate with the guerrillas nor accept a guerrilla state next door. Lastly, as a result of the Israeli elections in December, the Labor Party is under pressure from its previous coalition partner, the National Religious Party, not to return the West Bank because of its religious significance. Unfortunately, the right-wing alignment (Likud) will provide no alternative, since it too wishes to keep the West Bank.

It is dilemmas such as these that inject a note of pessimism into prognostications about the future. Although one may share the hope that a peace settlement, however convoluted it might be, will emerge, it would come as no surprise if the call to arms were heard again.

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#### Notes

1. *New York Times*, September 2, 1967, September 4, 1967 (hereafter cited as NYT).

2. The National Religious Party, a coalition partner of the Labor Party, also adhered to the view that the West Bank ought to be retained because of its religious significance.

3. James Feron, "Yigal Allon Has Supporters, Moshe Dayan Has Disciples," *New York Times Magazine*, April 27, 1969, pp. 92-97. In mid-1968 Dayan visited the West Bank and Gaza and told the Arab leaders that, since Israel assumed the situation would last for some time, it was prepared to begin large-scale, long-term planning and improvements in the occupied areas. See NYT, July 29, 1968. About the same time *Ma'ariv* quoted Dayan as saying that he viewed the area from Jordan to the Mediterranean as the land of Israel and the

Jordan River and the mountaintops to the west of the Jordan River as the basis for defending Israeli borders. See *Arab Report and Record*, no. 12, June 16-30, 1968, p. 178 (hereafter cited as ARR).

4. Gil Carl Al Roy, "The Prospects of War in the Middle East," *Commentary*, vol. 47, March 1969, p. 59. *Newsweek*, May 13, 1968, p. 44.

5. Abha Eban, address to the World Zionist Congress, Jerusalem, June 15, 1968, as cited in ARR no. 12, June 16-30, 1968, p. 179.

6. On the Allon plan, see *Le Monde* (Paris), June 11, 1968; NYT, June 18, 1968, and January 24, 1969. One writer argued that the Allon plan represented the most Israel could concede without the Cabinet falling. See E. R. J. Owen, "Israel and the Arabs," *World Today*, vol. 24, December 1968, p. 491.

7. *Daily Star* (Beirut), January 26, 1971. For a description of the Sharn al-

Sheikh area and its significance, see *NYT*, April 2, 1971. On April 2, 1971, the Israeli Housing Ministry indicated that it would develop Golan in order to increase the population by thirty percent, according to *ARR*, no. 7, April 1-16, 1971, p. 206. By mid-1973 there were 47 Israeli settlements: 4 in Gaza, 8 in the Sinai, 19 on the West Bank, and 16 on the Golan Heights.

8. *Daily Star* (Beirut), January 26, 1971. Although a key Israeli planner, Dr. Elisha Ephrat, confirmed that Israel had a thirty-year development plan for the West Bank, he stressed that it had no political significance. See *Daily Star* (Beirut), February 13, 1971. In April 1971 a Labor Party convention passed a resolution indicating an intention to keep Sharm al-Sheikh, Golan, Gaza, and East Jerusalem, according to *NYT*, April 8, 1971, and *Daily Star* (Beirut), April 8, 1971.

9. *Newsweek*, April 9, 1973. The *Newsweek* summary of Sadat's comments is drawn from his interview with Arnaud de Borchgrave. The full text was reported by Cairo Domestic Service in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* (hereafter referred to as *FBIS*), April 4, 1973, pp. G1-G5. On March 26 President Sadat addressed a joint meeting of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) Central Committee and the People's Assembly. He repeatedly stressed that the nation had arrived at a "landmark" point in the struggle with Israel that was characterized by "all-out confrontation." To make the world feel the Arab pressure, he called for "an earnest military move, an earnest political move and a move in every direction." Near the end of his remarks he stated that the responsibilities of the coming stage, the stage of all-out confrontation were: "First, completing the military building so it may complete its task with all strength, with all that we have and with all that we possess; and second, completing the diplomatic move which . . . will not stop before the battle, during the battle and after the battle." See statement by President Anwar as-Sadat at the March 26 joint meeting of the ASU Central Committee and the People's Assembly, Cairo Domestic Service in *FBIS*, March 27, 1973, pp. G1-G18, especially pp. G8 and G16.

10. Speech by President Anwar as-Sadat before the joint meeting of the ASU Central Committee and the People's Assembly, Cairo, July 23, 1973, *FBIS*, pp. G1-G24. See, in particular, pp. G19-G24.

11. See Final Declaration of the Fourth Conference of the Heads of State and Government of the Nonaligned Countries, *Tanjung* (Belgrade), September 1973, in *FBIS*, September 11, 1973, p. AA18.

12. For the Arab reaction to Kissinger's U.N. speech, see, for example, *Cairo Voice of the Arabs*, September 25, 1973, in *FBIS*, September 26, 1973, p. A1; *Press Review on Kissinger U.N. speech*, *Cairo Domestic Service*, in *FBIS*, September 28, 1973, pp. G2-G3; *Cairo Voice of the Arabs* (Abd al-Fattah Commentary), September 28, 1973, in *FBIS*, September 27, 1973, pp. A3-A6.

13. On the Galili Document, see items from *Hu'arez*, August 30, 1973, Jerusalem Domestic Service, September 3, 1973, and Jerusalem International Service, in *FBIS*, September 5, 1973, pp. H1-H2.

14. Speech of President Hafez al-Assad over Damascus radio and television, Damascus Domestic Service, October 6, 1973, in *FBIS*, October 9, 1973, pp. F2-F4.

15. That the Egyptian and Syrian goals were limited is suggested by the surprise shown over the early successes. The Egyptian press referred to the breaching of the Bar Lev line ("the wall of fear") as a miracle. See Muhammad Heisani Heykal, "Frankly Speaking," *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), October 26, 1973, as reported in *FBIS*, October 26, 1973, p. 14. Moreover, the chagrin of Libya's Qaddafi with the limited aims of the Egyptian war plan also suggested that Cairo and Damascus expected no dramatic breakthroughs. See speech delivered by Libyan Revolutionary Command Council Chairman Muammar al-Qaddafi, Tripoli, October 7, 1973, Tripoli Domestic Service, in *FBIS*, October 9, 1973, pp. T2-T9, especially pp. T3-T4.

16. On October 13 the military editor of *Al-Ahram* said that advancing and gaining territory were not the primary tasks. The goal, he suggested, was to inflict heavy losses on the Israeli Defense Force. This echoed the comments of Heykal in *Al-Ahram*, October 13, 1973, to the effect that the destruction of the Israeli military and the creation of social and economic strain in Israel were the goals. He argued that the Israelis would be shaken because of their concern for lives. For an Egyptian account of the preparations for war, see Heykal's interview of War Minister and Commander in Chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces, General Ahmad Isma'il, *Cairo MENA*, in *FBIS*, November 20, 1973, pp. G6-G15; also see the interview of Egyptian Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Sa'id ad-Din ash-Shadhili, by the editor of *Al-Akhar* (Cairo), *MENA*, in *FBIS*, November 23, pp. G1-G6.

17. One reason, among others, the Egyptian Army delayed was probably the influence of Russian military doctrine, which stresses consolidation of mass formations, supported by air defense and artillery, moving forward to secure objectives, consolidating again, then moving forward, and so on.

18. Heykal referred to the Israeli use of tanks as "guerrilla warfare with tanks" and discussed the failure of command and control at the juncture of the Second and Third Egyptian Armies. He also argued that the United States was partially responsible because SR-71 overflights had, he believed, located the weak link. See Muhammad Heisani Heykal, "Frankly, a Second Question—the Story of Infiltration, the Gap," *Cairo MENA*, in *FBIS*, October 29, 1973, pp. G13-G19.

19. *NYT*, February 12, 1974; *Denver Post*, February 18, 1974.

20. *Cairo Voice of the Arabs*, November 28, 1973, in *FBIS*, November 29, 1973, p. A2.

We are pleased to announce that **Air University Review** received First Place (magazine or periodical, one color) for outstanding government publications produced in 1973. The distinction was accorded to the May-June 1973 issue of the **Review** in the annual Blue Pencil Award competition sponsored by the Federal Editors Association.





Military Affairs Abroad

## TRENDS IN SOVIET SUPPORT FOR AFRICAN LIBERATION

WILLIAM G. THOM

THE Soviet Union today is one of the most important sources of aid for African nationalist guerrilla movements involved in "liberation struggles" against Africa's white regimes. Since Western governments have refused significant support to these movements, the Soviets—by extending material aid—have maneuvered them into a position which appears to condone the white regimes of Africa and which thus opens them to attack from Third World

countries. African guerrilla movements appear high on the list of candidates for substantially increased Soviet support.

The purpose of this article is to examine general Soviet policy toward the various African liberation groups that have emerged during the last decade. Two main areas will be discussed: the historical basis for Soviet support of "national liberation," in general; and examples of Soviet involvement with specific African movements. Contemporary African movements will be identified with regard to Soviet support. The bulk of the study will involve the Soviet decision to back these contemporary movements, the relative importance of this Soviet aid, Moscow's policy toward individual groups, and finally Sino-Soviet competition for the allegiance of the various groups.

#### *historical development*

Communist support for national liberation movements is older than the Soviet state. Marx and Engels sympathized with most of the revolutionary and national emancipation movements of their day. Soviet responsibility to foreign liberation struggles was recognized early in the history of the state, but Africa tended to be viewed in terms of European colonialism or not at all. Black Africa did not become a serious concern of Soviet foreign policy until the late 1950s. For the first forty years of Soviet history—a period often marked by sweeping revolutionary expectations—Africa stood on the outermost edge of Soviet consciousness.<sup>1</sup> Early party conventions paid lip service to the cause of the nonwhite world but primarily as a consequence of anti-colonialism.

A pronounced change from the previous Soviet policy of African noninvolvement occurred in the late 1950s and early 1960s as the tide of nationalism swept most text-

book colonialism out of Africa. The decolonization process appeared to Russian observers as damaging to the West and therefore beneficial to World Communism—if it could be properly exploited. Both the Soviets and the Chinese stressed that wars of national liberation were in fact aspects of the world revolution against imperialism.<sup>2</sup>

Khrushchev more than any other figure shifted emphasis to the Third World and to Africa—what he called the underdeveloped third of mankind. He saw the retreat of colonialism as a decisive opportunity to weaken the West in the era of cold war tension and nuclear stalemate. It was in the Khrushchev period that the concept of wars of national liberation was popularized. It is not difficult to see a relationship between this phenomenon and changing Soviet policy toward involvement with African nationalist movements.

#### *practicality of African liberation*

After the wave of independence broke on the African continent in the early 1960s, Soviet policy-makers had to decide whether the remaining nationalist movements were worth supporting. This required a hard look at their chances for success and at the political value of merely giving them support. As these movements emerged in the early sixties, the Soviets seemed to have no definitive policy. In 1962, for example, Soviet writers praised various nationalist movements in Mozambique that later merged to form the Mozambique Liberation Front.<sup>3</sup> Despite favorable commentary, it seems the Soviets were confused by the prospect of having to support multiple liberation groups, sometimes within one country. Having made little headway with newly independent states, somewhere in the mid or late sixties the Soviets resigned themselves to playing a support-



ing role in helping those territories yet to be "liberated," particularly the Portuguese territories.

Whether the U.S.S.R. really believed in the ultimate success of the movements is open to speculation. It is probable, however, that the Soviets saw more in these movements than the prospects of independent pro-Soviet states. Because of their initial clumsiness in Africa, the Soviets were widely regarded with suspicion. Support for the liberation groups then became an opening that could gain them some respectability in African eyes and at the same time damage the West. At the very least the Soviets could not be called allies of the colonial/imperialist powers. Furthermore, the main Soviet goal in Africa may not have been to establish pro-Communist regimes but rather to exploit the rift between African elites and the West. This would have the effect of keeping Africa a source of division, conflict, and ultimate danger.<sup>4</sup> This more modest goal may well underlie Soviet aid programs for the guerrilla forces.

African liberation movements have identity problems stemming from their lack of exposure and the general lack of importance attached to them outside Africa. In the Third World, there has been extensive acceptance of the African movements. The Soviet Union has supported many of these organizations in the last decade. All are relatively small, and they seek ultimately to wrest control of their respective homelands from white-controlled governments. All have turned to violence in some form, some founding active insurgencies. In most cases it is politically convenient for the Soviets to extend at least verbal support.

The fact that the Soviets assist African liberation movements is widely known. Writers during the sixties warned of Communist training for subversive cadres to be used in Africa. Despite these warnings, the success of the guerrilla movements them-

selves does not seem to have been a prime motivating factor. The Russians realized, however, that they could get a maximum political return on a minimal investment.<sup>5</sup> By aiding the cause of African liberation against the "evils of racism" in southern Africa, they saw the opportunity to score a propaganda coup. One might even speculate as to whether Moscow has wanted the insurgents to triumph and terminate this advantageous situation for one of uncertainty. Or on the other hand, whether the movements themselves are really seeking self-perpetuation above all else.

#### *significance of Soviet aid*

The value of Soviet backing for the various movements is great, and thus the way is clear for Moscow to exert its influence on them and extract what it can in fringe benefits. This situation, advantageous to the Soviets, leaves the movements open to verbal attack from their enemies. Training is perhaps the most important form of aid for both the donor and recipient. For the movements, the learning of techniques is more pertinent to their situation than receiving equipment. For the Soviets, training offers their best opportunity to indoctrinate the potential cadre. Formal instruction in guerrilla strategy and tactics has been the most fruitful method for transmitting Communist ideas on guerrilla warfare. Virtually every major African guerrilla movement has sent selected recruits to the Soviet Union and other Communist states for intensive training.<sup>6</sup>

The type of training administered by the Soviets was recently outlined to a journalist by two ex-guerrillas in Mozambique. The first studied political warfare at the Central Komsomol School in Moscow during 1966-67. The principal subjects were political science and economics, the history of Communism, and laws of nature. Students at the school came from several

African states. This guerrilla was selected for advanced study in political subversion, including how to carry out a coup d'état and how to subvert an army. The second former guerrilla was sent to Moscow in 1965 and was later sent to a ten-month course at the Guerrilla Warfare Training School in the Crimea. The training was in guerrilla tactics and weapons, with periods of political teachings. All the students were African. These are just two of the many Africans (estimated in the hundreds) that undergo training in Moscow and the Crimea each year.<sup>7</sup> Training and indoctrination continue to be a vital part of the overall Soviet policy toward the liberation movements.

Cuban training assistance may be in collaboration with Soviet efforts. The Cubans did much to popularize guerrilla warfare. Cuban policy has strongly supported revolutionary causes in Africa, and Cuban academies with Communist/revolutionary themes are reported to train over 700 students from black Africa at a time.<sup>8</sup>

*the Africans, the Russians, and  
the Organization of African Unity*

Most guerrilla leaders view the aid they receive from the Soviets as Moscow's duty in its role as leader of socialist nations. At the same time they remain sensitive to being identified with Communism. Amilcar Cabral, the late guerrilla leader from Portuguese Guinea, has stated that the aid his group receives from the socialist countries is a historical obligation. Agostinho Neto, the Angolan revolutionary leader, maintains that his organization is not subordinate in its policy to any foreign power and that any statements to the contrary are propagandistic fantasy. He states that people fighting for their independence will take aid from wherever they can, even from the Devil himself.<sup>9</sup>

The Organization of African Unity (OAU),

through its African Liberation Committee (ALC), has sought to be the chief vehicle for aiding and influencing the movements. Most of the funds for the movements is channeled through the ALC, which has tended to function more as a political organization. OAU/ALC recognition is important to the movements, but it is secondary in overall importance to Soviet support. According to Cabral, the OAU responded to his requests for weapons and supplies, but quantities were insufficient to meet his needs. Cabral's strongest thanks were reserved for the U.S.S.R.<sup>10</sup> The OAU/ALC, being weak in resources, cannot carry as much weight as the Soviets when it comes to material assistance, but it remains a respectable showcase for the voices of African liberation free from the tinge of Communism.

*relations with individual movements*

The more significant bilateral relations are those with the movements of Portuguese Africa. These groups are the most viable of the African liberation movements and are the beneficiaries of the most Soviet attention. Largely through Soviet efforts, these organizations were grouped into the Conference of Nationalist Parties of the Portuguese Colonies (CONCP). The members of CONCP are PAIGC (Portuguese Guinea), MPLA (Angola), and FRELIMO (Mozambique). It is the writer's opinion that the CONCP may be seen as the Soviets' attempt to centralize their control over these movements, to increase their propaganda impact.

In 1962 the Soviets described the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) as a progressive nationalist organization. They claimed that PAIGC guerrilla fighters obtained their weapons by taking them away from the Portuguese, indicating the Soviets were not supplying arms at this time or at least were not publicizing it. By the end of the



year it was reported that the PAIGC had secured significant international support in Africa and, more important, from the Soviet Union. According to more recent reports, not only have the Soviets provided material assistance, training facilities, and diplomatic support but this contribution has constituted the largest single amount of aid given to the PAIGC.<sup>11</sup>

The PAIGC now depends on the Soviets for everything from rocket launchers to pencils. Consequently, the PAIGC duly supports the Soviet line. On the other hand, the Soviets have in the PAIGC their best investment among liberation movements in Africa. The PAIGC is generally regarded as the most effective movement, with the best chance of ultimate success. The PAIGC was the first African group to receive the Soviet-built SA-7, a portable heat-seeking surface-to-air missile. This weapon was introduced in Southeast Asia in 1972. The PAIGC is increasing its military efforts and in September 1973 declared its independence unilaterally.

The Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) is Moscow's choice in Portuguese East Africa. FRELIMO is unique in that it also receives substantial support from the People's Republic of China. FRELIMO President Samora Machel acknowledges assistance from both Moscow and Peking, describing them as "the only ones who will really help us. . . . They have fought armed struggles, and whatever they have learned that is relevant to Mozambique we will use." These blunt statements by Machel reveal a great deal of pragmatism by this military man. Soviet support of FRELIMO's armed struggle was expressed in 1972 with the delivery of 122-mm artillery rockets.<sup>12</sup>

In Angola, Soviet aid was decisive in creating a viable movement, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Consequently, the MPLA follows the Soviet line more closely than the others.

This group, however, has not been as successful in the field. The MPLA, like many other movements of its type, experiences much internal turbulence and personnel turnover. Therefore, a shortage of trained military personnel does not necessarily mean that not enough have been trained. Aside from defections and desertions, combat losses must also be considered. The shortage of modern arms may not be of great significance. Often older weapons (small arms) provided by the Soviets are better suited for the conditions of guerrilla warfare in the tropics. They are more durable and are easier to maintain. Numerous weapons either are lost to the Portuguese in combat by poorly trained troops or are captured by security forces when guerrilla hideouts and arms caches are uncovered.

#### *other Soviet-backed movements*

In Rhodesia, where guerrilla activity has been sporadic, the Soviets back the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), one of three current movements seeking to liberate Zimbabwe (Rhodesia). Following Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence in November 1965, ZAPU was banned in Rhodesia and began operating in exile. ZAPU came under Soviet influence through its association with the strongly Soviet-oriented African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, the two sharing their plight in exile. By the late 1960s dissident ZAPU students in Europe began contesting their movement's Moscow orientation. They claimed ZAPU representatives abroad were puppets of "Soviet Revisionists" while their Chinese-backed rival, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), was making progress because of its "impartial, loyal, strong, and disinterested allies."<sup>13</sup> The charges of the ZAPU students may have been justified because nearly all the credit for

the current guerrilla campaign in Rhodesia has gone to ZANU. At least in Rhodesia, it appears the Soviets are not backing the leading contender.

In Namibia (South-West Africa) guerrillas of the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) carry on very sporadic activity in the Caprivi Strip from bases across the border. Some SWAPO members are known to have been trained in the U.S.S.R., and Moscow has been a principal source of material aid. SWAPO, like ZAPU in Rhodesia, is much smaller in size and in the scope of its operations than any of the CONCP movements. Although neither SWAPO nor ZAPU seems remotely near achieving success, at least in SWAPO the Soviets enjoy the luxury of supporting the only effective movement to carry on the semblance of an armed struggle in the country it hopes to liberate. Therefore, Moscow is the sole beneficiary of any credit given for the support of Namibian liberation.

The South African ANC has been supported by the Soviets but is perhaps overshadowed by the South African Communist Party (SACP). The Soviet-oriented SACP has been around for many years (it sent representatives to Moscow in 1921), but it was forced underground by the Suppression of Communism Act in 1950. It has the title and prestige of being the first African Communist party, and it maintains close contact with both Moscow and the ANC. Like the ANC, it is mainly in exile. The ANC, composed of black Africans while the SACP has many whites, is thought to have been responsible for the detonation of several propaganda pamphlet bombs in the Republic of South Africa over the past few years. Although the ANC has been unsuccessful in initiating insurgency in South Africa, that country's racial policies make continued Soviet support for the movement necessary if the Soviets wish to exploit the situation.

#### *dangers of world power involvement*

The involvement of other world powers in the contemporary African liberation scene can only be a cause for concern in Moscow. Thus far it appears that competition with Communist China for the allegiance of the various movements is the chief threat to Soviet policy objectives. The West has not sought involvement in this arena. The Western powers have not taken any direct action to underwrite substantially the position of the white states fighting against the African nationalist movements, despite their self-professed importance to the West as bulwarks against the tide of Communism; and the West has done even less for the liberation forces. It might be argued that the West has not yet had to make a real decision on helping the staunchly anti-Communist white minority regimes because these regimes have not to date been seriously threatened by insurgency. Africa is probably also well down the list of priorities for all the major powers concerned.

The Soviets, as would any great power, face the danger of becoming too involved in these struggles. In certain circumstances, limited involvement has a spiraling effect: that is, the involvement of one great power in an East-West or Sino-Soviet rivalry has the effect of compelling its competitors to intervene. The danger would be greater if a power were propping up a government engulfed in insurgency. However, any situation where a great power's prestige is on the line—even if backing the insurgents—has its inherent danger.

#### *Sino-Soviet competition*

As the 1950s gave birth to the popularity of guerrilla warfare, Moscow and Peking became competitors for the leadership of world revolution. The Soviets believed they had to make up for the prestige China had gained as a result of the global recog-



nition given to Mao Tse-tung's revolutionary theories. They wanted to refocus attention on Moscow as the leader of world revolution. Both nations began using the means at their disposal in the search for influence in the Third World.

In general, the Soviet Union has supported the larger and more prestigious liberation groups, while China has backed the also-rans. This was mainly because the Soviets saw the inherent foreign policy advantages before the Chinese did and also because they were in a better economic position to do so. The various African movements currently receive Soviet and Chinese support as follows:

| <i>Soviet-supported</i> | <i>Chinese-supported</i> | <i>Neither</i> |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|----------------|
| PAIGC*                  | FRELIMO*                 | GRAE*          |
| FRELIMO*                | ZANU                     | FROLIZI        |
| MPLA*                   | COREMO                   |                |
| ZAPU                    | UNITA                    |                |
| SWAPO                   | PAC                      |                |
| ANC                     |                          |                |

\*Larger movements with several thousand combatants.

The Sino-Soviet rivalry is perhaps most apparent in aid programs for FRELIMO. The Chinese attempt to undermine Soviet influence through grassroots programs at FRELIMO training camps in Tanzania. The Soviets counter by using their superior resources to provide better weapons, equipment, and training abroad. The challenge to Soviet influence in FRELIMO may be partially explained by the large Chinese presence in Tanzania, where FRELIMO has much of its infrastructure. Peking may also be using FRELIMO as a test case to determine the Soviet response.

Race is an obstacle the Soviets face in their efforts to combat Chinese influence. The Chinese claim that Moscow is not qualified to guide the African movements because Russia is traditionally a European power. The inference here is that, while Russia has been a white European power not far removed from the despised colonial powers, China herself has been a victim

of European colonialism. The Soviets recognize the race factor as potentially dangerous to their position, and it may cause them to be more ready with aid when they think it necessary to counter Chinese efforts.

*the outlook*

The outlook for continuing Sino-Soviet rivalry will depend on Moscow's desire to meet China's challenge. Since the late sixties Chinese aid to the liberation movements has increased significantly. Some observers believe competition between the Communist powers is likely to expand the sources of aid available to the insurgent movements in the future.<sup>14</sup> Chinese power in the coming decades will probably continue to grow, and this will allow Peking to become more actively involved with African guerrilla movements and to encourage African militancy at the expense of the U.S.S.R.'s professed leadership of the international Communist movement.

Soviet motivation is based on several factors, only one of which aims to help the African liberation movements achieve their goal of independence. In fact, this factor seems to be overshadowed by other considerations; namely, exerting influence over the movements for propaganda purposes, keeping Africa in turmoil to upset the West, and countering Chinese attempts to supplant the Soviets as patriarch of the revolutionaries.

The consequences of continued, and perhaps growing, Sino-Soviet involvement are serious aspects of the problem. At the United Nations Conference on African Liberation held at Oslo, Norway, in April 1973, both the Soviet Union and China strongly voiced their support for the struggle. Aside from the normal verbal praise, the Soviets, in particular, proudly cited their material assistance to the movements and their desire to increase this aid.

The discovery of new Soviet weapons in the hands of African guerrillas, such as the 122-mm rocket and SA-7 missile of Vietnam fame, can only lead to speculation that we may be witnessing the beginning of a new era of increased Soviet aid to these movements. If increased Soviet and/or Chinese assistance materializes in the coming decade, some of the movements

will become more effective and progress to a point where their ultimate objectives will be within reach. Soviet policy will then take on new meaning for Africa and the West, as it will claim a place for Moscow at the independence celebrations as principal sponsor of several new African regimes.

#### Notes


1. Robert Legvold, *Soviet Policy in West Africa* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 1.
2. J. B. Bell, *The Myth of the Guerrilla* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), p. 43.
3. David Morison, *The USSR and Africa 1945-1963* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 102-3.
4. Adam B. Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-67* (New York: Praeger, 1971), pp. 641-42.
5. Bell, p. 100.
6. Kenneth W. Grundy, *Guerrilla Struggle in Africa: An Analysis and Preview* (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1971), p. 51.
7. Brig. Michael Calvert, "Counter-Insurgency in Mozambique," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute*, no. 118, March 1973.
8. D. C. Hodges and R. E. Abu Shanab, editors, *NLF National Liberation Fronts 1960/1970* (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1972), pp. 169-70.
9. Basil Davidson, *In the Eye of the Storm: Angola's People* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1972), pp. 298-97.
10. Hodges and Abu Shanab, p. 168.
11. Grundy, p. 102.
12. Calvert, p. 84.
13. Richard Gibson, *African Liberation Movements: Contemporary Struggles against White Minority Rule* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 177.
14. Grundy, p. 137.



## Air Force Review

# U.S. AIR FORCE/AIR WEATHER SERVICE NIGHTTIME SPECTACULAR

MAJOR HENRY W. BRANDLI



*The DMSP satellite*

A DATA SYSTEM employed by the Department of Defense and the U.S. Air Force's Air Weather Service was recently made public. While certain aspects of this data system remain classified, all meteorological and environmental data that are gathered from space and all specifications necessary to make full use of the imagery are now available. This system became widely known as the Data Acquisition and Processing Program (DAPP), but its name was changed to Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP), effective 13 December 1973. Images captured by the low-light sensor in this system are discussed in this article. These nighttime images in the visible and near-infrared not only have enhanced operational meteorological support but also provide a promising new research tool with civil as well as military potential.

### *nighttime imagery*

The accompanying illustrations provide graphic examples of nighttime

images taken near local midnight in different areas of the world. City lights, auroral displays, volcanoes, oil and gas fields, and forest fires are some of the phenomena detected by one of the radiometric sensors of the DAPP. This high-resolution 2.0 nautical-miles radiometer of the DAPP system "sees" in the spectral interval from .4 to 1.1 microns. Therefore, the information displayed in the images provides an added bonus in that important subvisual and supervisual events occurring below the satellite are detected in addition to that detected in the visual range (.5 to .7 microns). With this sun-synchronous satellite system, nighttime coverage of the same location can usually be achieved twice each night. These DAPP satellites record imagery at a map scale of 1:7,500,000 or 1:15,000,000 from a viewing platform 450 nautical miles high.

#### *aurora borealis*

One such "bird's-eye view" shows the lights of many North American cities and the aurora borealis or northern lights. (Figure 1) The mapping and study of this important space phenomenon have been a challenge since first observed from the ground. Now this mapping and research can be done routinely by a system already in-being. Such broad-scale depictions of the aurora are a first by DAPP. As mentioned earlier, the human eye only senses energy in the spectral interval from .5 to .7 microns while the low-light sensor of DAPP records energy emissions out to 1.1 microns. Since important emission lines of the aurora extend out to 1.08 microns, the broader spectral interval captured by DAPP results in the very bright scene displayed on the imagery. That is, the sensor has processed the emissions from a wider viewing band and presented it to our eyes as a very intense auroral display.

#### *auroral effects*

Knowledge of the aurora is important for many reasons. By analysis of aircraft and ground laboratory data and their correlation with the DAPP imagery, it was found that the location of the auroral-produced D, E, and F ionization layers could be determined and the occurrence of polar magnetic substorms observed.<sup>1</sup> This technique will permit real-time observations of the extremely complex and variable polar ionosphere. These imagery observations, in turn, promise to provide data crucial to the operation of over-the-horizon detection systems and high-frequency radios. In addition, this DAPP correlation provides information on refraction and range errors to SPACE TRACK radars, as well as information on local density variations that relate to drag on orbiting satellites. These near real-time observations are already operationally available to the large computer complex at the Air Force Global Weather Central at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska. The world energy crisis suggests yet another use for DAPP data.

#### *the energy crisis*

Further examination of Figure 1 shows the brightness (i.e., intensity) of the illumination from all major and minor cities in North America. The large cities forming the megalopolis of the northeast, Chicago along the shore of Lake Michigan, and the far western population centers of Los Angeles and San Francisco are all shown under no-moonlight conditions. Miami and the "Gold Coast" of southern Florida are equally bright. During our present energy crisis, the DAPP nighttime low-light sensor could monitor city light intensities. According to 1970 General Electric surveys, direct energy consumption from lighting accounts for about 20 percent of the country's electric power consumption or be-





*Figure 1. A nighttime montage of North America depicts city lights and the aurora borealis, from a DAPP high-resolution sensor on two revolutions of a synchronous satellite. Besides enabling new research on the aurora and its effects, information can be gleaned from such imagery for use in geographical gridding, forest fire detection, light pollution, energy evaluation, electrical storm detection, volcanic location, oil field intelligence, and many other areas of investigation.*

tween 4 and 5 percent of the total energy consumption.<sup>2</sup> In some of the larger cities, consumption is even higher. New York City's Consolidated Edison reports 40 percent of its power goes for lighting. In addition to providing information on energy consumption, these "lights" aid the tactical meteorologist in his efforts to accurately place "weather" phenomena such as clouds.

#### *city light location*

Geographical location and gridding of real-time meteorological satellite systems of the Department of Defense, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration comprise a difficult task. The importance of putting latitude and longitude lines on satellite imagery cannot be stressed enough, yet difficulties do exist in computer mapping. At this stage of development, without sufficient human quality control, great errors in computer gridding can occur. If a photo is not gridded properly, the location of all information derived from it is unreliable. Figure 1 presents no problems in geographical interpretation to a human observer. However, another tactic for solving the difficult gridding problem presents itself here with the storage in a computer of this city light location and intensity much like a stellar background used for space navigation. In this manner, the simultaneous, three-dimensional, infrared imagery could be accurately gridded. Also, spurious lighting could be studied for other physical events such as forest fires.

#### *fires*

The United States and Canada spend untold numbers of dollars for forest fire detection in remote areas of North America. The low-moonlight DAPP sensor, as well as other sensors of the DAPP system such as the .3NM-resolution infrared 8-13 micron

radiometer, could be of great assistance in locating forest fires. The normal DAPP configuration, in which two operational satellites produce imagery over a particular area every six hours, is certainly capable of performing such a task. A computer-stored city illumination map, as mentioned earlier, could aid in the location of new forest fires by sounding an alarm when a "light" cannot be identified. It must be noted, however, that not all spurious light sources are forest fires.

An unusual amount of light is seen emanating from Cuba in Figure 1. City lights? These numerous bright spots are probably sugarcane fields being burned. This agricultural event is similar to the rice paddy burnings in Southeast Asia. These events can be of extreme importance militarily. Coupled with other meteorological parameters, reduction to visibility from smoke and haze could be easily predicted. In addition, targeting "visibility" is enhanced by these burning lights. The oil fields of Ploesti during the Second World War would have easily been seen on DAPP nighttime visual imagery.

#### *oil fields or energy source*

Figures 2 and 3 are also nighttime imagery, with and without moonlight, over southern Europe and North Africa. Well-lighted oil fields can be readily detected in the North African desert. Halos appear around some of the light sources, along with short black lines parallel to the radiometer scan lines. The black lines appear to originate at the brightest sources of light. This sensor or atmospheric phenomenon will be discussed in the next section on volcanoes.

#### *volcanoes*

Figure 4 imagery was taken over the Hawaiian Islands in the central Pacific before a new-moon phase. The bright "light" with







Figure 2. Southern Europe and northern Africa in Air Weather Service DAPP high-resolution local midnight photo, 1.5NM resolution, 4 to 1.1 microns, without moonlight

Figure 3. The same general area, photographed under similar conditions on 19 March 1973, except that a full moon was shining








Figure 4. DAPP high-resolution (HR) photograph of the Hawaiian Islands (local midnight, no moonlight) shows erupting Kilauea volcano and the lights of Oahu, Honolulu, and Waikiki Beach.

Figure 5. The HR sensors capture not only lightning but nuclear tests, missile launches, nose cone re-entry, and many other occurrences of interest to scientists and national security authorities.





the haloed rings around it is the erupting volcano of Kilauea. This ringed pattern could be a halo formed by ice crystal clouds, volcanic smoke particles, or even an out-of-focus mirror in the radiometric sensor. The geometry of this halo is similar to the rings occasionally seen around the sun or moon caused by ice-crystal cirrus clouds. These ringed patterns are also seen around oil and gas fields, except over the United States and other industrial nations where the oil and gas fields are capped. Volcanic eruptions, both explosive and effusive, can easily be seen in remote areas with this nighttime visual and near infrared sensor. On the island of Oahu, Honolulu and Waikiki Beach stand out as the large elongated bright spot on the photo. A careful check of current events is important for the DAPP analyst, lest bright apparitions like nuclear explosions escape his examination of the images.

#### *lightning and nuclear tests*

Any other bright spot on the nighttime images not accounted for could be nuclear

tests, missile launches, nose cone re-entry, electrical storms, etc. Lightning activity in intense storm areas is clearly captured on these brief views of the earth by the DAPP sensors. (Figure 5)

THE AURORA, city light intensity, nighttime gridding, forest fires, lightning, volcanoes, and oil and gas fields are only a few of the many spectacular intelligence yields available from the low-light visible sensor of the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program. Other sensor applications, particularly in the field of meteorology, will no doubt be presented in many scientific journals and symposiums in the near future. Perhaps the knowledge of this unique system and some of the applications presented here will stimulate the reader to think of other uses for the DMSP.

*Det. 11, 6 Weather Wing (AWS)*

#### Notes

1. Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories *Newsletter* no. 444, 6 April 1973.
2. "Today," Cocoa, FL, Associated Press, 19 January 1974.

In My Opinion

WHAT WE KNOW, AND WHAT WE DON'T  
KNOW, ABOUT TACTICAL NUCLEAR WAR

JOHN F. SCOTT





TIME, science, and the self-interests of the Soviet Union—not the SALT I agreements—have brought us to a U.S.–U.S.S.R. parity in strategic nuclear deterrents. SALT I simply affirmed the futility of returning to more psychologically comforting doctrines for deterrence. Some of us might have longed for the resurrection of massive retaliation; some for the nuclear trip wire—massive retaliation once removed—for the continued military security of the United States and its allies in Western Europe. But no longer do these qualify as serious alternatives save for debates about “what could have been.” We have to turn greater attention to what is probably a more credible deterrent to many types of military hostilities and political coercion aimed at West Europe. Tactical nuclear forces seem to be this next logical order of business.

Then, too, failing another incident like Czechoslovakia in 1968 or another Cuban missile crisis, there is reason to believe that NATO and its east European counterpart, the Warsaw Pact, are on the eve of a decade of arms control negotiations, perhaps even actual force reductions by both sides. It is not possible to negotiate arms control and force reductions for Europe, much less reach agreement, without first considering the disposition and future roles of tactical and theater nuclear weapons. It matters little whether the West declares theater-deployed nuclear capabilities as a nonnegotiable subject; it matters even less that Soviet strategists declare “tactical nuclear war” as a nonevent. The nuclear capabilities to conduct “limited” nuclear operations are there, as a part of both sides’ deterrence and defense forces.

It is a time, I believe, for taking stock, for going directly to a summary of what those of us who study tactical nuclear deterrence and defense know and do not know about it.

First, we are not certain how to define tactical nuclear war. Strategists disagree, both about its definition and about the utility of legitimizing it as a concept by defining it. Some would argue that “nuclear” and “limited” are contradictory terms and that “tactical” is no more than a euphemism for “limited.” But, to avoid both hard-nosed assertion and lengthy semantic cutting and pasting, my own candidate definition is that a tactical nuclear war is one in which the use of nuclear weapons is restricted by choice to the destruction or direct impediment of military forces on or over the battlefield.

Probably the most important thing we know about nuclear weapons in war is that to use them, and sometimes how they are used, can be matters of choice. No one is compelled to use nuclear weapons—they do not launch themselves. Technology would permit such automaticity, but currently that is not the way nuclear war would begin. As with the start of most wars, human beings must choose.

We know that the first side to use nuclear weapons in a conventional war can control the size and the scope of this first nuclear action. Measured in numbers of nuclear explosions, that action can be as small and brief as one, or it can be many over a period of hours or days. In other words, there can be such a thing as a “tactical,” or localized and otherwise limited, nuclear war—at least for a time.

On this subject of choice, we should add the qualification that we don’t know how much freedom of choice really exists as the war grows longer and maybe bigger. Prior to the first use of nuclear weapons against a nuclear opponent, the range of choice for when to initiate and how much to use extends into several dimensional concepts: now or later; from one to many weapons; from a small geographical area to a larger one; from small nuclear yields to larger;

and so on. Logically, compared to later in such a war, the range of choice is now the largest. But once chosen and executed, the initial nuclear use can be expected to induce a reaction from the opponent, and from that point on each side's nuclear action, or lack of it, will probably shape the other's next choice. Therefore, choice becomes more circumscribed, even though many "options" still could exist.

We think we know another reason why choices dwindle: the longer the war continues and the larger it grows, the more inclined are the belligerents to act on their expectations of what might happen next, rather than to act on what had happened previously. Neither side would feel comfortable waiting to see if the other side were going to try to destroy its strategic retaliatory forces. Neither side would feel comfortable watching its own tactical forces being destroyed, leaving it fewer and fewer "options" for its next move. Choice remains, but it is narrowed in the sense of *incentives* to choose some actions in preference to others. Or so we think.

The nuclear power that intentionally limits the number of its nuclear options for what it believes to be a better deterrence posture must logically limit its choices for war and war termination. One could argue that the capability to creep up the escalation ladder does not mean that one *must* climb it gradually, any more than the capability to escalate precipitously means that an opponent believes you will leap out of the tactical arena.

We think we know that the people and political authorities in nuclear nations want to avoid becoming involved in either tactical or strategic nuclear war. Some nations see no benefits whatsoever in warfare. Some nations see no benefits in nuclear war worth the possible negative consequences of what another nuclear power might do in retaliation. These latter nations—that is, their

human decision-makers—can be said to be deterred from starting nuclear wars or in starting wars that could become nuclear.

Decision-makers are not only deterred by what they do *not* know about nuclear wars; they are deterred as well by what they *do* know (or think they know). They know that nuclear weapons could make a war different from any in history by their possibilities for collapsing time and expanding destruction. No other war could match a nuclear war in destructiveness in so little time, whether measured worldwide or within the tactical arena. For those who are or should be deterred from choosing war, this time-destruction parlay means that they will have less time than in other wars to make what could be the most important decisions in history, in terms of consequences for mankind. However, we may be wrong in this assumption of "rationality" \* on the part of statesmen. We won't know who might be pretending madness, who might be mad, or who might be harmfully ignorant.

Mainly because of what we know and don't know about tactical nuclear war, we do not know anyone who can tell us how to "win" in a two-sided nuclear war. Some people claim to know; that is, they use the terms "win" and "lose." They might very well have their own serviceable definition of "win," but we are still waiting, skeptically, to hear and be convinced.

It seems more likely that win and lose are concepts without sensible application to the results of nuclear wars. Nuclear war begins with someone's choice and will probably end the same way. That is all we know. True, someone, someday, might claim victory; but, like the "victorious" Pyrrhus surveying his own losses, he will also say that he can't afford another victory like this!

\* A rational decision is the product of a decision-maker who anticipates the consequences of his possible choices and has a preference for some consequences over others.



In spite of the worst features of what we know about tactical nuclear weapons and war, we don't know of good alternatives to nuclear weapons for maintaining a stable security in some areas of the world. Strategists do not know how to deter possibly hostile decision-makers who control nuclear weapons and massive conventional forces unless tactical nuclear forces remain at the service of a threatened ally. Perhaps we in the United States, our allies, and our rivals can someday convince each other that no one plans to be an aggressor by coming to mutually satisfying agreements about the strengths and locations of military forces. One of the better features of tactical nuclear weapons is that they tend to encourage these kinds of agreements; they might, in addition, someday help to keep the agreements working.

In sum, we know much more than we sometimes realize; we don't know nearly as much as we sometimes assert. We shall never be certain how much we know; we won't ever convert all the important things we do not know to things we want to know.

Is this singsong account the sum of our knowledge? Certainly not, but it might indeed be a tracing of the boundaries of our knowledge.

What about the "giants" of the field; surely they have more than this to say, do they not? Indeed they do, in a more charming and penetrating manner, as well; but would it change this summary? I am not convinced that tactical nuclear deterrence and defense have been treated seriously as anything more than smaller-scale analogies to strategic nuclear deterrence and defense.

Of what use is this knowledge, and this ignorance? An illustration is in order. I

would propose these principles of tactical nuclear strategy and of nuclear strategy as a whole:

1. Don't threaten nuclear actions—tactical, limited but beyond tactical, or strategic—to deter types of military aggression that could be stopped by conventional, non-nuclear means. This might seem self-evidently prudent to many of us, but the number of proposals to the contrary in the open literature is impressive.

2. Don't accept any doctrine that specifies "very early" tactical nuclear initiations against attacking conventional forces. The more believable such a deterrent threat is to an opponent, the more likely that military preparedness measures on both sides in crises will encourage nuclear pre-emption, turning deterrence on its head.

3. Do accept the idea of tactical nuclear war as an option, among other options, to deter or to attempt to terminate some types of war. To become an observable phenomenon, tactical nuclear war requires the cooperation—the observation of limitations—by both sides; but to become an option for deterrence and defense, it requires the preparedness action of one side.

4. Do continue to respect the psychological value of nuclear weapons. Using one or a few in a conflict against a nonnuclear opponent just to suggest that they might really be used in some future war for greater stakes only cheapens their value at no gain. Besides, one's major nuclear opponents can play this game too.<sup>o</sup>

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<sup>o</sup> The reader interested in views contrary to mine will find good examples in W. S. Bennett, R. R. Sandoval, and R. G. Shreffler, "A Credible Nuclear-Emphasis Defense for NATO," *Orbis*, Summer 1973, pp. 463-79; and in Phillip A. Karber, "Nuclear Weapons and 'Flexible Response,'" *Orbis*, Summer 1970, pp. 284-97.

# UNIONIZATION OF THE MILITARY

*A Fable for the Seventies?*

LIEUTENANT COLONEL WILLIAM V. RICE, JR.

EXECUTIVE Order 12988 has been issued less than two years, and already Air Force commanders are feeling the impact of the new benefits and responsibilities given to members of the armed forces. You will recall that EO 12988 is the Executive Order promulgated by President Moe Bushkin which permits members of the armed forces to form unions whose primary purpose is improvement of the conditions of their employment. To paraphrase President Bushkin:

Whereas, the well-being of the members of the Armed Forces and efficient administration of the Department of Defense are benefited by providing members of the Armed Forces an opportunity to participate in the formulation and implementation of personnel policies and practices affecting the conditions of their employment; and whereas, the participation of Armed Forces members should be improved through the maintenance of constructive and cooperative relationships between labor organizations and management officials; . . .

Executive Order 12988 was obviously patterned after Executive Order 10988 promulgated by President John F. Kennedy in 1962. This Executive Order allowed federal civilian employees to participate in collective actions through unions. Since 1962 the federal Civil Service has been almost completely unionized, and with the abolition of the Civil Service Commission in late 1977 private sector collective bargaining has replaced the so-called "merit system" in federal civilian employment.

The pressure for more representation for the rank and file became evident when the goal of a voluntary armed service was

reached during the second Nixon administration. The draft-based armed force was not a fertile field for unionization, since the prevailing attitude among young draftees was "All I want out of the armed forces is me." But attitudes changed with the coming of the career service based on volunteers who expected to spend a large portion of their working lives in the armed forces. The years spent in the armed forces were no longer an unfortunate interlude between high school and college or between school and career. The individual now had a vested interest in improving his working conditions over a 20- or 30-year career.

The career serviceman also had a much broader vision than the draftees of the sixties. He found that his community of interest encompassed not only members of his own race or sex but all members of the armed services. This new vision did not come about overnight but evolved out of the various groups formed to remedy specific ills of the late sixties and early seventies. The narrow goals of the "liberated woman" and the "disadvantaged black" were integrated with the goals of the "voiceless Junior Officer Council" and the "NCO Council with no responsibility." These groups found that they were engaged in a zero sum game, a game in which Peter must be robbed to pay Paul. The Department of Defense, in establishing programs to allow for the legitimate aspirations of blacks or women, for junior officers, or any particular group, found itself taking from one to give to the other according to who was applying the most pressure at the time. Out of these contending parties grew the



premise that they had more in common than they had in conflict and that real progress could be better accomplished through collective action than through fragmentation. (The American Federation of Labor learned this in the 1880s, but each generation must reinvent its own "wheel.")

Unionization of the armed forces was also given a boost by a decision of the then Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management Relations, W. J. Usery, Jr., in 1971.<sup>1</sup> This decision, the so-called Mayport Doctrine, stated among other things that a "moonlighting" service member working in a nonappropriated-fund activity could not be excluded from the bargaining unit solely because he was under the "ultimate control" of the armed forces. In brief, the moonlighting GI had the right to form, join, or assist a labor organization freely and without fear of penalty or reprisal.

The job in the nonappropriated-fund activity was made more important to the moonlighter when President Nixon signed the Henderson Bill (H.R. 9092) in August 1972.<sup>2</sup> This bill brought all nonappropriated-fund employees under the wage board salary system effective 30 April 1973. The reader will remember too well the crunch in which the base commander was caught by the provisions of this bill. Higher salaries throughout the base exchange system meant less funds to pay the higher salaries of the nonappropriated employees. Some observers said that this bill was a blessing in disguise, since at last some order was brought to the nonappropriated-fund system, which had almost gotten out of control. Commanders now had to take a hard look at the nonappropriated functions they had inherited, to determine which contributed to the morale and welfare of the troops and which ones had to go because they were in the "nice to have" category, serving a limited number of personnel. But the moonlighting GI was better paid

in his second job and therefore had a vested interest in it.

It should also be remembered that the bargaining units, which are only now emerging, were not easy to determine. As with the federal civilian employee during the decade of the sixties, the military unions attempted to gerrymander units to include groups in which they had strength. The union movement was further fragmented by attempts of various craft groups to form their own restrictive bargaining units. For example, navigators were among the first to attempt to organize a craft union. Even though navigators fully subscribed to the conventional axiom, "Your main job is to fly and fight," it was readily apparent to even the casual observer that promotions and increased responsibilities were more readily available to craftsmen other than navigators.

The Air Force forestalled the activities of the navigators union in much the same way that a nonunion firm in the private sector attempts to keep the union out: by giving the navigator some of the responsibilities his union was seeking.<sup>3</sup> The Air Force made strides in eliminating discrimination based not only on the color of the skin or the shape of the body but also based on the type of wings possessed or their lack.

Another factor in the unionization of the armed forces was the disenchantment of the Congress with the military after the conclusion of the Vietnam war. The traditional paternalistic attitude of the Congress was replaced by a skepticism that reflected the feelings of the country as a whole. Political reputations were made by jousting with such visible windmills as "the Pentagon" and "the military-industrial complex," though no one was required to define in detail the real problems involved. Further, with their acquittal, the defendants in the Pentagon Papers case were made folk heroes who, in the image of a Robin

Hood, "stole from the Pentagon to give to the people" and were lionized on the college lecture circuit.

The traditional avenues for the care and feeding of military personnel were closing. The Air Force Association had never been more than an association, not a lobbying organization, and it chose to remain a professional organization—in contrast to the course taken by the National Education Association when pressured by the American Federation of Teachers. With the repeal in 1975 of the 1967 legislation tying military pay increases to increases in salaries of the federal General Schedule (GS) employees, military pay was beginning to lag behind that in civil service and in the private sector. The 1967 law tying military pay to GS pay was always an administrative convenience difficult to justify on economic grounds. Further, the policy of giving a percentage increase in pay only served to widen the gap in pay between the lower ranks (who were the ones needed to man the volunteer force) and the officer ranks (who were basically volunteers anyway). In short, the military service was left without an effective advocate.

The military employee had only to look around him to see the effectiveness of other special interest groups in lobbying with Congress. Of particular interest were the unions of federal civilian employees, which, following the tradition of postal unions, were among the most effective groups in Washington. So, though military unionism was viewed with great apprehension by the military establishment, it was tolerated and in some instances surreptitiously aided by the military bureaucracy in accomplishing the function of a lobby group.

BY THIS TIME the reader is perhaps thinking, "A fable indeed! It's a

bad dream, an impossibility." I would remind him that for almost two hundred years in the history of our country the idea of any public employee joining a union, participating in a union's activities, or taking collective action through a union was almost unthinkable. Yet we find that, as of November 1973, 84 percent of all federal blue-collar civilian employees and 47 percent of all federal white-collar civilian employees were represented by a union. The federal postal employees are now exempt from usual Civil Service Commission rules and procedures. The Postal Corporation is presently engaging in collective bargaining very similar to that in the private sector. In September 1973, 52,000 public school teachers were "on strike."

It should be further noted that there is precedent in other Western countries for unions of military personnel. West Germany, Norway, Sweden, and Austria allow unionization of the military in various degrees.<sup>4</sup>

Another question that usually arises in any discussion of military unions is the question of the strike. The words "union" and "strike" are synonymous in the minds of many public sector managers. In my judgment the argument that unions inevitably lead to strikes is absolutely wrong at worst and specious at best. It is an emotional argument that succeeds only in clouding the issue. The Executive Order governing labor management relations for federal civilian employees may be suspended at any time by the President.<sup>5</sup> Further, the authority to suspend any provision of the order is delegated to agency heads with respect to any installation outside the United States "when he [the agency head] determines that this is necessary in the national interest."<sup>6</sup>

Is a union of military personnel legal? At least one civilian attorney would hold that it is.<sup>7</sup> Daniel P. Sullivan states, "A



unilateral, nonbinding form of grievance procedure, used in restricted areas within a union movement and kept within proper bounds in the military, would appear to be permissible under recent practices and legal developments."<sup>8</sup>

It is not the purpose of this article to build a case either for or against unions of military personnel, but I would suggest that now is the time for discussion and thought on the subject. Now is the time for commanders to listen to their people, whether they speak as individuals or through NCO councils, EEO, JOC, or other organizations. I am not recommending the ritual dance sometimes played out between supervisors and their people, but, to borrow a term from collective bargaining parlance, I do recommend "good faith" discussions, with open communication both up and down the command chain.

It couldn't happen here? Military personnel will never have any collective rights through unions? The same opinion was held for decades about public civilian employee rights.

All government employees should realize that the process of collective bargaining, as usually understood, cannot be transplanted into the public service. It has its distinct and

insurmountable limitations when applied to public personnel management. The very nature and purpose of government make it impossible for administrative officials to represent fully or to bind the employee in mutual discussions with government employee organizations. The employer is the whole people, who speak by laws enacted by their representatives in Congress. Accordingly, administrative officials and employees alike are governed and guided, and in many cases restricted, by laws which establish policies, procedures, or rules in personnel matters.<sup>9</sup>

Unions of civilian public employees have made great strides since President Roosevelt wrote the cited letter in 1937. If the decade of the sixties was the decade for the public civilian employee to embrace collective bargaining, will the decade of the seventies see the formation of military unions? Eric Hoffer has said, "We are not worried about our footing when we are about to jump. It is when we have nowhere to jump that we begin to worry about the soundness of our position."<sup>10</sup> Perhaps now is the time to review thoroughly the Department of Defense position on unions of military personnel, not after we find we have been caught up by circumstances and indeed "have nowhere to jump."

*Air University Institute for  
Professional Development*

#### Notes

1. "Government Employees Relations Report," Number 402, Washington, The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., May 24, 1971, p. E-1.

2. "Government Employees Relations Report," Number 466, Washington, The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., August 21, 1972, p. A-7.

3. The "Ryan letter" of March 1973 was only a temporary setback, since it flew in the face of a cherished Air Force shibboleth, i.e., that any Air Force officer should be able to do any Air Force job. Additionally, once the navigator was given opportunity to command a flying organization, much like the blacks who wanted to eat at the dime store lunch counter in the 60s, he found that it was not such a big deal after all.

4. Perhaps the most objective study of the unionization of the armed forces in West Germany and Norway is that of Lieutenant Colonel James L. Quinn and Major Ronald V. Grabler, *Military Unions: The Advantages and Dis-*

*advantages of Unionization within the Armed Forces*, SLTR 24-71, School of Systems and Logistics, Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, September 1971.

5. Executive Order 11491, as amended.

6. Executive Order 11491, Section 3(4)(c).


7. Daniel P. Sullivan, "Soldiers and Unions—Protected First Amendment Right?" *Labor Law Journal*, September 1969, pp. 581-90.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 590.

9. President Franklin D. Roosevelt in a letter to the President of the National Federation of Federal Employees, cited in Wilson R. Hart, *Collective Bargaining in the Federal Civil Service* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961), p. 21.


10. Eric Hoffer, *The Passionate State of Mind* (New York: Harper and Row, 1955), p. 93.

IN the two years since the President's visit stimulated Americans to rediscover China, there has been renewed interest in long neglected aspects of American-Chinese military and political involvement before 1949. So many publications recalling this chapter of American history have been hatched that the recent bibliography contains over 200 worthwhile books and lengthy articles. This vigorous outpouring is occurring in other countries as well, especially in the Soviet Union, where a number of memoirs have been produced recollecting magnanimous Russian deeds for the Chinese. A lengthy book, *China's Special Region*, by Peter P. Vladimirov, who was a Comintern agent and a Tass correspondent to Yen-an during the 1940s, appears to be the most promising. According to Leo Guiliow of *The Christian Science Monitor*, the book's first printing of 150,000 copies sold out in one day. By far the most successful in the English language has been Barbara Tuchman's Pulitzer Prize-winning biography, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-1945*, which has excited and whetted appetites for more about this phase of American relations with China. Although her work has been the most



## UNDERSTANDING THE SHIFTING CHINA SCENE

LIEUTENANT COLONEL GORDON K. PICKLER







In the Davies book, Lauchlin Currie, Lend-Lease Administrator for China, receives belated recognition for his dynamic role in China. Facing viewer are Currie and Captain Hsuehyen Lee, later General and Chief of the Nationalist Chinese Air Force.

widely read and has received the most glowing reviews, it is not the most accurate, comprehensive, and penetrating one. Of all the publications produced in the last two years, that distinction belongs to the aptly titled *Dragon by the Tail: American, British, Japanese, and Russian Encounters with China and One Another* by John Paton Davies, Jr.† His subtitle denotes the book's great scope—the external and internal competition and collision incidental to the struggle over which group would have predominant control, the Chinese themselves or one or more foreign powers.

The author witnessed firsthand most of the strife in China during the 1930s and '40s. Born in 1908 to a missionary family in China, he stayed on with his parents most of his impressionable youth and returned to America only to attend a university. In the turbulent thirties, he went back as a young clerk in the U.S. Foreign Service. During most of the war years of

the forties, he was General Joseph W. Stilwell's political affairs adviser. Subsequently, Davies was shifted to Moscow and then served in other important diplomatic posts. Later, along with other China specialists, he was caught up in the McCarthy Red Scare. Although he stoutly countered successive charges of disloyalty, he was dismissed by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. As happened to many other "old China hands," his reputation and career languished for fifteen years until the State Department reinstated his security clearance in 1969.

*Dragon by the Tail* is a readable and absorbing book. It abounds in vivid character sketches of personalities and descriptions of Chinese cities. The background chapters on geography and Chinese society and politics are broad-ranging, brilliant, yet succinct. His explanation of the traditional Chinese concern for "face" exemplifies his keen understanding of the Chinese psyche

† John Paton Davies, Jr., *Dragon by the Tail: American, British, Japanese, and Russian Encounters with China and One Another* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972, \$10.00), 448 pages.

and his ability to convey this in highly perceptible images. Davies treats Chinese Communist and Nationalist figures with equal detachment and subtle understanding. Chu Teh, the founder of the People's Liberation Army, finally receives recognition as a dominant, mature revolutionary figure who had lived a full-spirited life even before the beginning of the famous Chu-Mao collaboration. Regarding American personalities, students of Chinese-American relations are now privileged to have many incisive evaluations of the U.S. diplomatic and consular officials in China and their counterparts in the Far Eastern Division of the State Department in Washington. To understand the predilections on which American Far East policy was based, one must have a measure of the policy-makers' personal biases. This is one of the prime values of Davies's work.

In this vein, the book highlights an American who was extremely influential in creating a favorable impression for the Nationalist government and who has never been given his due for vastly influencing China policy. This was Lauchlin Currie, the "prototype of the professor come to a position of influence in the White House." (p. 211) Currie was also the archetype American who, during a short visit to China, became overawed by Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek and their sense of purpose and who, on returning, undertook to entangle his government's fortunes with those of the Nationalist Chinese. Although General Stilwell and Ambassador Patrick Hurley, that vilified envoy of FDR, have been the subject of numerous books and articles, surprisingly none has ever appeared about Currie. He was the leading figure pushing for action at the highest executive and legislative levels of government to get authority to assist China and then implement the official and unofficial commitments. He was able to

undertake a number of projects with a reasonable degree of certainty of their success. As a former Harvard professor of economics who had joined the New Deal earlier in the thirties and was in 1941 a member of the State Department on loan to the White House as special assistant, he had direct access to the President through Harry Hopkins.

Currie, with a storehouse of information and dynamic personality, had undertaken a fact-finding mission to China for President Roosevelt in January 1941. Although Currie knew little about China as a civilization, the President believed his eager assistant was qualified to determine the seriousness of China's plight as well as its immediate military requirements. He left China convinced of the worthiness of the Nationalist course and determined to exert a diligent and persistent effort to assist China in building a powerful air force. Moreover, he sought to influence other, more hesitant American leaders to this end. Subsequently, he worked with such vigor and forcefulness for China that some cabinet members felt he had aligned his interests with those of the Chinese.

When Currie returned to the U.S., President Roosevelt charged him with overseeing China's Lend-Lease program. This included developing contacts between the beneficiary government and the War Department in attempting to expedite Chinese requests. To this end, Currie asked Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson for backing to procure favorable action on the first huge Chinese requisition. Included as part of an enormous order for war materiel, the aircraft request alone amounted to almost \$500 million and would have required over one billion tons of shipping capacity. The Chinese had requisitioned 2800 pursuit ships, 856 bombers, 1056 trainers, and 66 transports, or a total of 4778 planes, to be delivered over a period of eighteen months. The War De-




partment rejected every detail of the request, but Currie was undaunted. Eventually, after a persevering effort, he obtained the transfer of 66 Lockheed-Hudson and Douglas medium bombers for China. He then attempted to influence the President, and should be given a great deal of the credit for swaying him, to approve a proposal to send a cadre of flying instructors, along with technical and maintenance personnel, to advise, train, and maintain a revitalized Chinese air force. In effect, the President agreed to dispatch an air advisory mission to China. It was this decision that resulted in creation of the American Advisory Group, which became popularly known as the "Flying Tigers."

Overly anxious to placate the Chinese, Currie sent a dispatch in July 1941 to Madame Chiang heralding the President's approval of the 66 bombers and the decision about the air mission. However, the

British government, which had first option on the planes, had not formally agreed to release them. Not until early September did the British agree to make available from their sources the bombers that Currie had promised prematurely, and actual delivery did not start for months. The Chinese soon learned that a favorable action on Currie's part to allocate aircraft did not, of itself, produce them. When no deliveries took place, as sometimes happened, Chinese resentment at the failure to follow through exacerbated relations between the two governments.

President Roosevelt again dispatched his congenial and sympathetic representative to China in July 1942. Currie's mission was to placate the Chinese government. He spent much time in July and August trying to smooth relations between General Stilwell and Generalissimo Chiang. Currie mollified the latter by vague promises of

*With the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the Nationalist Chinese Air Force had a hodgepodge of aircraft, mostly American.*



increasing China's air power—thought to be the end-all, cure-all for China's military invigoration—and of working for Stilwell's recall. Currie subsequently tried quite vigorously and persistently, like most other Stilwell detractors, to use the General's negative qualities against him. (pp. 250–54)

Especially engrossing for those interested in the political uses of air power are the book's accounts of the U.S. government and its nationals' playing a major role in the development of Nationalist Chinese military and civil aviation. Davies makes clear that this involvement often substituted for a lack of other initiatives. There was no consistent American policy toward Nationalist China in the thirties and forties, and Washington's agencies and representatives often worked at cross-purposes. Still, from the Davies narrative, one can discern three distinct objectives that the U.S. sought in providing aid in the form of aviation as-

sistance to the Chinese Nationalists:

- countering Japanese aggression
- forestalling Soviet domination of the Chinese Nationalist government and its air force
- preventing an eventual Chinese Communist victory.

Davies tells why and how these objectives were pursued:

Following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, China's air arm was quickly decimated, and the Nationalists sought help from the major aviation powers. The United States equivocated in its response, but the Soviet Union quickly extended aid to China's air force. In the interest of its own security, Russia wanted to divert the attention of the Japanese from the Soviet Far East by tying them down in central China. At the same time Soviet

*From the Hankow airfield the Chinese flew American-made pursuit planes and Italian- and German-made bombers, such as the one in the far background. Pilots rest on 5-gallon refueling cans.*






flyers could gain combat experience and become acquainted with Japanese air tactics. Moscow sent aircraft, volunteer pilots, and maintenance personnel. Soviet airmen engaged the Japanese in aerial combat above China's major interior cities, bombed and strafed Japanese river and coastal shipping, attacked Japanese airfields in China, and made forays against targets on Taiwan. The Japanese, in turn, attacked Russian air bases in China. By the time the undeclared war in China's skies ended for the Russians in 1941, Moscow had sent about 700 planes. Approximately 2000 Russian aviators had actively participated in the hostilities, shooting down about 425 Japanese aircraft.

As the Soviet government had increased the Chinese Air Force's ability to resist the Japanese in the air and boosted Chinese morale, American consular officials, at-

tachés, and air advisers in China became concerned over the possible political consequences of the Russian aid. The Americans welcomed the Russians' efforts to counter Japanese aggression, but at the same time they expressed apprehension that Moscow might gain a dominant position in Chinese aviation.

When the war in Europe forced the Soviets to withdraw most of their advisers from China, the Chinese government increased its efforts to secure American aid. The Generalissimo and his representatives petitioned Washington officials for support, and Claire L. Chennault and Chinese agents were dispatched to the United States to provide the military expertise for the campaign. Sympathetic Washington officials like Currie got the President to approve forming and equipping the force that was to become the Flying Tigers.

*A Russian TB-3 bomber at the Hankow airdrome, one of only a few Russian 4-engine bombers there, was used in China to transport personnel to and from Russia.*



Other efforts to obtain assistance for the Chinese met with some success when China was included under the Lend-Lease Bill. However, the program provided very limited assistance in the way of aircraft to the Chinese Air Force. Although President Roosevelt promised deliveries of fighters and bombers as a sop to the Chinese government, the U.S. Army Air Force only grudgingly provided assistance. It believed the aircraft would be wasted—the Chinese would either crash them or fail to maintain them. Washington was alerted concerning the likelihood of such an eventuality as early as 1942 by the very perceptive Davies, who had held discussions with Nationalist General Yang Chieh. The latter had represented China in the negotiations for Soviet supplies and had warned Davies that America should be more tough-minded than the Russians had been. (pp. 248–49)

The Chinese general pointed out that the Russians had afforded impressive support and had added to the difficulties of the Japanese in China but had grown disillusioned and frustrated. The Russians had too quickly agreed to supply credit for military equipment and aircraft, and at lower prices than could be obtained in the West. However, the Russians saw this equipment misused and the aircraft crashed by inexperienced Chinese pilots who would not follow or had not understood Russian instructions. Their anger mounted as the Chinese hoarded material that scarcely found its way into combat against the Japanese. General Yang Chieh warned Davies that he should counsel his government against becoming similarly disillusioned. The U.S., after assuming the task of rebuilding the Chinese Air Force in 1941 and helping fight in the skies over China,

*En route from Sian to Lanchou. Over the wingtip one can see the Wei River valley and the rugged terrain over which the Russians flew in China.*





eventually became even more deeply involved and disillusioned than had the Russians.

While the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were primarily interested in helping China ward off Japanese aggression, their competition in training and outfitting the Chinese Air Force had broad political implications and ramifications—in that the outcome might be that one nation or the other gained control over Chinese aviation and thus was assisted in gaining dominance over the Chinese government. Chennault clearly understood this and closely followed Russian activities, as he indicated in his book, *Way of a Fighter*. Davies points out that Chennault's superior and antagonist, Stilwell, did not do so. However, in reflecting about this dedicated fighting soldier, trying to carry out what he thought was his mission, Davies charges that the War Department "squandered" Stilwell's talents. All of his efforts and energy were wasted in

what Davies termed a "self-defeating mission." (p. 341)

We have in Davies's work a lively, unerring account of China's historical development and U.S. involvement with her until 1949. His truthful, unhurried narrative of Chinese-American relations is illuminating even for the expert. Although some authoritative manuscripts remain unfinished—notably the fourth volume of Forrest C. Pogue's work on General George C. Marshall and the reminiscences of old China hand and aircraft salesman William Pawley—*Dragon by the Tail* is the best produced thus far. Readers and students who have had no previous exposure to Chinese-American relations during the World War II years and are unaware of the polemical aspects between governments and military figures should consider Davies's book an excellent introduction and reliable reference.

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## NEW RELATIONS WITH THE "NEW MILITARY"?

COLONEL HARLEY E. BARNHART

IN PAST YEARS, few scholars and commentators in this country paid much genuine attention to study of the Latin American military. This was not because the historical significance of the armed forces as a group was unappreciated; it was because they were a known quantity and could be used as a constant in political

equations. With one or two explainable exceptions, they were the regrettable by-product of struggles for liberation, allies of the oligarchy, conservative or reactionary, anachronisms in their asserted role as national defenders, and—above all—obstacles to needed progress.

One course in Latin American history or

the reading of a few Senate committee hearings on the Foreign Assistance Act was enough to give one the essential idea—a Herblock-like cartoon of a bemedaled pomposity walking with boots and spurs across the backs of peons. Time was better spent, if one chose to study Latin America, investigating the more progressive forces at work or gathering evidence of U.S. neocolonialism.

To be fair, there have been conservative stereotypes as well, in which the Latin American military appear as good old boys, fellow defenders against the Red Menace, and friends of the foreign investor. Academic blessings for such concepts, however, have been slender in this age of “liberalism” on the campus and in the foundations.<sup>1</sup>

These contrasting views traditionally have clashed in the operative areas of economic and military assistance, weapon sales policies, and the maintenance of U.S. military missions. Those who view the military as an obsolete burden naturally have pressed for all possible disassociation. The supporters of military assistance programs (MAP) have insisted, at least since 1960, that the programs are essential to help maintain orderly conditions required for economic progress and to keep up advantageous contacts with a powerful political force.

The result of this policy debate over the last decade has been a pronounced movement toward disassociation and a low U.S. “profile.” Grant materiel assistance, ended for the “big six” South American countries after 1967, has shrunk to about \$5 million per year. Training programs have been kept level at around \$11 million per year, but they are subject to increasing constraints.<sup>2</sup>

Legislative ceilings, bans on “sophisticated” weapons and “arms for dictators,” and last-minute authorizations for the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program have

prompted Latin American countries to turn to Europe as their main source of military purchases. The U.S. military missions, whose history and functions predate the MAP, have been severely reduced in the interests of economy and “low profile.” Two countries, Peru and Ecuador, have ousted U.S. missions, blaming—with evident justification—U.S. efforts to use military grants and sales as “leverage” in economic and political disputes. Peru is now purchasing some military equipment, including tanks, from the U.S.S.R.<sup>3</sup>

Public safety assistance under the Agency for International Development has suffered concurrent retrenchment, amid charges that such aid involved the United States in torture and other repressive acts. Aside from issues over methods or amounts, key Congressional leaders increasingly have challenged the essential thesis that the United States should have any interest in assisting any Latin American government with its problems of internal security. Typical of Congressional criticism is this questioning of then Assistant Secretary of State Charles Meyer by Senator Frank Church during hearings in 1969:

*Sen. Church.* . . . you refer to “inadequate and inequitable economic social structures which are vulnerable to subversion” as one of the justifications for our counterinsurgency assistance to Latin America. If economic and social structures are inadequate and inequitable, why shouldn’t they be subverted?

*Mr. Meyer.* I think, Mr. Chairman, it depends on a definition of subversion. I am the first to admit . . . there is a very difficult line to draw between, I would say, positive revolt and total disorder.

*Sen. Church.* . . . Let me phrase the question a little differently. Do we still believe in the right of revolution?

*Mr. Meyer.* We do believe in the right of revolution?



*Sen. Church.* We do believe in it. That really is our national birthright, isn't it? Well, I find it very difficult to reconcile your statement that we continue to believe in the right of revolution with the thrust of our policy in Latin America.<sup>4</sup>

Senator William Proxmire expressed similar views in questioning Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird:

*Sen. Proxmire.* . . . In a letter to Chairman Ellender, dated April 14, 1972, General Seignious stated: "The general rationale for these programs is that although militarily the threat of external attack from outside the hemisphere or Cuba has diminished, the violent extremism remains a disruptive force to economic and social progress with active movements existing in Bolivia, Guatemala, and Uruguay and potential insurgencies in other countries."

Does that mean that the United States is supporting incumbent regimes in Latin America against purely domestic attack, or even the mere threat of domestic insurgency? Have we used military assistance in such a way that we are deciding who should rule Latin American countries?

*Sec. Laird.* No, it does not.

*Sen. Proxmire.* Why, then, are we providing this assistance?<sup>5</sup>

Just as this process of disassociation has been running its course, indications have arisen that the academic community in this country might be developing a new and more investigative interest in the political and social role of the Latin American military. The current approaches are sometimes no more objective than the older ones, but at least we are being offered a greater variety of views.

The principal impetus for this, of course, has been the establishment and continuance of a populist, revolutionary military regime

in Peru, where the governing junta will fit neither the caudillo nor the "good old boy" mold.

A conspicuous example of this trend toward objectivity is the book, *Military Rule in Latin America: Function, Consequences and Perspectives*, edited by Philippe C. Schmitter.† Four of this book's five chapters stem from a seminar held under the auspices of the Center for Policy Study, University of Chicago. Funding was from the Ford Foundation, and publication was under the auspices of a committee that included Morris Janowitz, Charles C. Moskos, Jr., Seymour Melman, and Adam Yarmolinsky. One might expect to read critical viewpoints.

The initial chapter, by Alain Rouquié, analyzes the evidence for existence of a "new military."<sup>6</sup> Rouquié is critical enough. In the intensified nationalism of recent military governments—notably in Peru, Bolivia, and Panama—he sees a rejection of the "Pentagon domination" that had tried to reduce Latin American military forces to police work, transforming them from their honorable military role into "forces of control and conservation." Counterinsurgency thus stands revealed as basically a neocolonialist plot.

Peru is the specimen Rouquié chooses for study. There, he finds, the peculiarities of the Army's feud with the APRA political party has led to "the presence of a majority of radicalized intellectuals among the professors and civilian collaborators" of the Center of Higher Military Studies (CAEM), which is generally accepted as the fount of social consciousness among the Peruvian military.

Add to the CAEM influence a profound and traumatic distaste for counterinsurgency operations experienced by Peru's

† Philippe C. Schmitter, editor, *Military Rule in Latin America: Function, Consequences and Perspectives* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1973, \$12.50 cloth, \$7.50 paper), xiii and 322 pages.

army in campaigns against guerrillas during 1965. Also add a galling resentment of U.S. arms transfer policies that sought to confine Peru's weapon acquisitions to fit "the subordinate functions which the inter-american division of military labor seemed to assign to it." Rouquié, who is from France, where the Mirage aircraft is manufactured, considers Peru's purchase of advanced weaponry from Europe to be deeply significant in turning the military away from its "antisubversive obsession and . . . preservation of the status quo."

In sum, Rouquié believes the conditions that created Peru's military revolutionaries are unique, and he finds little evidence that revolutionary trends are as likely in other countries where the military has taken charge—not even in Bolivia or Panama, which he searched as plausible ground. Nor is he persuaded that Peru's military will stay revolutionary, unless they devise forms of institutionalized contact between leaders and led.

Having so dispatched the pretensions of the "new" military, Schmitter devotes the remainder of his volume to the old. Geoffrey Kemp has a good chapter on the prospects for control of arms transfers in the region. One of its especially valuable contributions is a survey of the external security concerns held by Latin American countries. This may surprise some who have accepted the idea that Latin American countries are not entitled to security concerns because the U.S. supplies a hemispheric shield. It would not surprise anyone who had reflected on the odds that the United States or the Organization of American States would spring to the rescue of any country attacked by its neighbor over some territorial or other issue.

Kemp has also done a thorough job of tracing the limited options available to the United States for discouraging the introduction of "sophisticated" or "excessive"

armaments. It is a pity that his realistic views in this area were not impressed upon some U.S. decision-makers before the region became a major market for Mirages and AMX tanks.

The other articles in the Schmitter volume form an interesting exercise in applied political science. The authors have set out to examine what empirical evidence may exist to prove or disprove some of the charges long advanced by critics of the military in Latin America and of U.S. association with them. Do the Latin American armed forces serve obligarchies and impede progress? Does U.S. military assistance encourage coups, stimulate arms races, or create the urge for unnecessary weapons?

The results of efforts to shed the light of modern data analysis on these perennial issues are intriguing. In one of the key chapters, Schmitter expertly massages data for military assistance, GNP, and arms purchases to reach the "inductive inference" that U.S. military assistance generally has raised defense expenditures of Latin American countries. To reach this inference, Schmitter has lumped credit assistance sales (FMS) with grants and surplus items to be considered as total military aid. Now, it seems scarcely worth proving that any country that buys much of its military equipment from the United States will see a correlation between the level of its received "military aid," so defined, and its total arms spending. Yet, the idea that concomitance—rather than cause and effect—is at work here seems not to have intruded upon Schmitter's conclusion. This despite his observation later in the piece that there seems to be little correlation between *grant* aid and total military spending in any country.

In other areas, Schmitter is more cautious. After a detailed analysis of possible correlations between various types of military



regimes, the incidence of regime changes, and military spending, he concludes that consistent patterns elude his analytical framework. Work wasted? Not if you compare the results with the usual cliché that “generals get into power and blow the country’s economy on useless weapons.”

All told, the effort in the Schmitter book is an honest and useful one. Perhaps no better evidence could be cited than this remarkable observation by James R. Kurth near the end of the final chapter:

In brief, the comparison of Latin American states for the last decade or so gives little support to the argument that U.S. foreign policies—defined in the strict sense of U.S. military interventions, advisory interventions, military aid, and economic aid—are a major explanation for Latin American military rule. Regretfully, we conclude that a convincing case for the argument has yet to be made. (p. 304)

This is a virtuoso performance in objectivity by Mr. Kurth, who elsewhere in the chapter accepts Schmitter’s generalization on MAP as a cause of arms races and likens U.S. military assistance to one soldier’s participation in a firing squad!

A BOOK of another sort altogether is Miles D. Wolpin’s *Military Aid and Counterrevolution in the Third World*. † Mr. Wolpin is a no-holds-barred critic of U.S. military assistance and military presence abroad, and he has written this volume in the obvious hope of giving these practices a good shellacking. Anyone interested in our military assistance policies should read the book, which Mr. Wolpin has prepared in scholarly style (if not scholarly spirit). There are abundant citations to sources, with emphasis on hostile witnesses

before Congressional hearings and the works of committed antiestablishment critics such as John Gerassi, James Petras, Edwin Lieuwen, and Maurice Zeitlin. To this Mr. Wolpin adds his own experience as a Ford Foundation researcher in Chile during the ambassadorship of Ralph Dungan (who, appropriately, must be reckoned about as hostile toward the military as any U.S. representative to Latin America in our time).<sup>7</sup>

The book is a handy, one-volume guide to most of the charges, slanderous and real, that critics aim at MAP, from its “neo-colonial” purposes and anticommunist inspiration through its inept and intellectually stunted practitioners, to its unresponsiveness to State and embassy direction (and, of course, “presumable” association with CIA), and to its role in fostering arms sales.

One soon appreciates that any success MAP has had in helping Latin American governments (civil or military) to preserve order and put down insurgency is but a source of ire for Wolpin, and it is important that anyone working in military assistance understand that reaction. For example, he terms as “*paranoid apprehension of social revolution*” the following quotation from General George R. Mather (former USCINCSO) before a House subcommittee:

What worries me about revolutions, is the attendant risk of chaos and anarchy, because I know there is a Communist presence in all of these countries which can take advantage of those conditions.<sup>8</sup>

It should be noted that General Mather, taken in context, was not talking about nice, social revolution; he was talking about the assassination, arson, riot, and ambush type of revolution. “But the meaning of his statement,” says Wolpin, “is that the

† Miles D. Wolpin, *Military Aid and Counterrevolution in the Third World* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1972, \$12.50), 327 pages.

United States and its dependent elites would have lost assured control of the client state—and herein lies the threat to Washington's informal empire.”

That's about enough to connote the flavor, but a further example of Wolpin's distortion is irresistible. Citing resurgent nationalism as a factor in the decline of U.S. mission activity, he asserts:

Thus Peru's military seized government office in 1968 and *promptly* expelled the entire mission of forty-seven officers and enlistees. In order to continue to receive replacements and spare parts, the regime was induced to receive a new seven man mission. But none of the personnel associated with the previous mission were allowed to return! The largely *interventionist* function of the earlier mission was *also* reflected by the fact that the drastically reduced mission informed a visiting congressional delegation that it had enough manpower to fulfill most of their public (statutory) duties! (Emphasis supplied; p. 112)

Among other things wrong with that picture is the fact that nearly eight months elapsed between the junta's coming to power, in October 1968, and the request for departure of the U.S. Military Group (MILGP). The interim had been filled with tensions resulting from Peru's seizure of the International Petroleum Company and several tuna boats. On 17 May 1969 the United States announced that all FMS sales *had been suspended since* 14 February. Aside from unfilled orders, this was the first notification to the government of Peru. The cessation of FMS was cited by Peru's Prime Minister Montagne Sanchez five days later as the reason for requesting MILGP withdrawal (by 1 July 1969).<sup>9</sup> Relations between the MILGP and their Peruvian military contacts had remained cordial through all this, but it would have been mani-

festly inappropriate, from the Peruvian viewpoint, to expel the MILGP and then accept members from it in the reduced MAAG at the U.S. Embassy. Wolpin's inference that activities of the MILGP members caused their expulsion is convenient but an un-supportable supposition.

Also reckless (or low cunning) is his implication that any duties beyond "statutory duties" performed by the MILGP must have been "interventionist." The report of the Congressional delegation to which he refers clearly notes that the only "statutory" duties (i.e., required by U.S. law) involved were to oversee the receipt of some MAP materiel still in the pipeline.<sup>10</sup> Apparently all other advisory and assistance duties of the MILGP were, by Wolpin definition, "interventionist."

Read the book, if you can find it in a library and don't have to buy it!

MORE perceptive challenges to the premises supporting military assistance to Latin America are found in a new book by Luigi Einaudi and several RAND associates, *Beyond Cuba: Latin America Takes Charge of Its Future*. †

Einaudi is a respected student of Latin America's current political scene, especially known for works on the Peruvian military<sup>11</sup> and on U.S. arms transfer policies.<sup>12</sup> This book is the culmination of several studies by him and RAND colleagues for the Department of State. Since completing the work, Mr. Einaudi has joined the Planning and Coordinating staff of the Department, where—in keeping with the trend of the times—he will be applying political science directly to the tasks at hand.

An introductory and essential theme of the book, developed in a chapter by

† Luigi Einaudi *et al.*, *Beyond Cuba: Latin America Takes Charge of Its Future* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1973, \$12.50), 250 pages.



Einaudi and David Ronfeldt, is that revolutionary violence and insurgency are not likely to be a serious internal security threat in Latin America at least during the 1970s. There will be no Vietnams to our south, and the Andes will not become a great Sierra Maestra.

“Nonrevolutionary violence” or “domestic political conflict” will continue, in forms such as peasant revolt and rural social banditry, strikes and riots, student rebellions, and assassination or murder of political leaders. Presumably included will be arson and bombing of businesses; the assassination, kidnapping, and extortion of foreign businessmen and diplomats; attacks on police posts and barracks, and so on.

How does one distinguish between revolutionary and nonrevolutionary violence? Possibly by the motives of the perpetrators and the successes of their methods. Thus, there should be some difference in whether an arsonist is a member of a significant revolutionary group or just a free anarchist spirit—and whether his act contributes to the creation of a revolutionary situation that challenges governmental survival. In practice, such distinctions are not always readily apparent.

At any rate, having made their distinction of kind, the authors turn it to challenge a key assumption underlying U.S. security assistance policies: the assumption that domestic political violence is harmful to development efforts and therefore cannot be tolerated. True, they admit, such violence may cause diversion of scarce resources to pay for more security capabilities, may frighten away foreign investors, and may damage fragile political institutions. But there is a good side. It will also spur ruling elites to be more responsive to popular needs and more innovative in their style. Thus:

The Peruvian revolution of 1968 was in part a

delayed response to problems highlighted by the 1965 insurgency but left unresolved once the immediate insurgency problem abated. . . . Indeed, even where the violence was considerable, as in Venezuela, the salutary consequences of the government's responses to insurgency may, over the long run, outweigh the temporary adverse effects. (p. 41)

Threats to U.S. interests, Ronfeldt and Einaudi believe, increasingly will be perceived in the acts of Latin American governments moving to correct the causes of violence, rather than in revolutionary elements that threaten to take over and do perhaps more of the same thing. Peru is, of course, the archetype, and some form of nationalistic corporatism the likely governmental model.

The issue of whether these governments will be civil or military is overdrawn, writes Mr. Ronfeldt in a chapter devoted to this topic. “The empirically common fact in Latin America is rule by civil-military coalitions, regardless of who formally occupies the chief executive offices.” The continued rise in effectiveness and power of civilian technocrats, the increasing diversity of political leanings among the military, and the common objectives of rapid development and reform all tend to draw compatible military and civilian leaders together to exercise power. Even in “liberal democratic” regimes, Ronfeldt notes, civilian leaders rely on military support for stability. Recent events in Chile and Uruguay have proved how fragile is the structure of democracy above that military support.

Improvements in the economies of most Latin American countries are expected by the contributors to *Beyond Cuba*. Among the influencing factors will be higher prices in extractive markets, better control over more diversified investments, continued regional cooperation, and government policies conducive to export production.

What happened to the coming demographic disaster? *Beyond Cuba* is concerned only with the next ten years, before the flood tide, and population growth rates "may well not continue unchecked" in any event.<sup>13</sup>

In international relations, the breakaway from identification with U.S. policies is expected to continue. Trade associations with Europe and the Orient, continued difficulties over the U.S. fishing rights and investments, and the end of Cold War diplomacy will all contribute—along with the psychological incentive to demonstrate independence as a feature of nationalism.

In sum, *Beyond Cuba* forecasts a Latin America for at least a decade thriving in benign Yanqui neglect, coping successfully, if sometimes turbulently, with problems of security and development, adapting its traditional forms to new conditions, and assuming a more independent status in a multipolar world.

Is U.S. military "assistance" an anachronistic concept for a region with these characteristics? Einaudi believes that it is, and he suggests that, in the military sphere, the United States should "cooperate on a technical and quasi-commercial basis through sales of such equipment and services as the United States makes available elsewhere, but terminating concessional military and police assistance programs." This prescription accompanies the recommendation:

*Economically*, to extend nondiscriminatory treatment to Latin America, but otherwise to treat trade and investment as primarily private matters, while seeking to offset major imbalances through multilateral programs and bilateral consultations. (p. 225)

If we can be persuaded, as Einaudi insists, that no Latin American government is going to fall to a leftist rebellion, creating a new locus of hostile power and influence in the hemisphere, what interests of the United States are served by money spent

on security assistance there? Or, to put the question more in terms of Mr. Einaudi's economic recommendation, why should we assist any incumbent government to cope with its internal security problems as a contribution to the conditions for its economic development—if we will not share the burden of responsibility for that development?

THESE are questions that strike directly at the principal reason advanced for military assistance to Latin America, which is that "Security Assistance furthers economic and social progress by helping to create and maintain a secure environment as well as contributing directly to national development through the various civic action projects it supports."<sup>14</sup> They are questions that won't be answered in this brief essay, but a few observations have to be made.

First, *Beyond Cuba* is a book about "Latin America," with all the overgeneralization that is implicit in that inescapable term. That means it is principally about the six larger countries of South America. One is easily convinced that these countries can handle their internal security problems without our help (even considering the violence being successfully perpetrated in Argentina today), which is why grant materiel MAP ended for them seven years ago.

The evidence is less convincing that some of the smaller countries will be so successfully independent in their security (or economic) objectives, and this is the reason that the Congress has continued to approve limited funds—most of these to three countries—for MAP materiel in recent years. A program of this magnitude is scarcely potent enough to threaten stifling the "beneficial" effects of "nonrevolutionary" violence, but we have already seen demon-



stration that a few helicopters and some rations and ammunition can contribute substantially to keeping bounds upon revolutionary disorders in a small country.

The amount of violence thus preserved is little consolation, of course, to the critics who would rather see the revolutionary Left prevail—or to those who would calmly accept that if it is what God wills. Yet, despite *Beyond Cuba's* believable forecast that U.S. interests will face increasingly difficult times from Latin American governments, it is certain that these interests would suffer even more from actions by any new governments of the revolutionary Left.

A *second* reservation: if the United States is going to adjust successfully to a Latin America “in charge of its own future,” we must keep cool and keep communications open. For this reason we should hope that Mr. Einaudi’s recommendation to *terminate* “concessional” military assistance programs is not applied too literally by policy-makers, even to the larger countries.

Strictly interpreted, this would mean raising interest rates on FMS credit sales to commercial levels, ending MAP-funded training, and recalling MAAG’s and MILGP’s unless the host country absorbed all costs.

FMS credits, direct and guaranteed, are narrowly concessionary (rates must equal those at which the U.S. government borrows), but they are frequently the difference between a decision to purchase from U.S. manufacturers or from European sources, which often are even more attractively subsidized. Enlightened self-interest thus decorates the concessionary aspects of the FMS programs.

The other programs, MAP training and MILGP’s/MAAG’s, are an essential part of security assistance to some of the smaller countries, but other reasons support their continuation for *all* of the Latin American countries they now serve.

Foremost among other reasons is the fact that the training programs and the missions provide a means of continued contact and rapport with Latin American military leaders, present and future. The term “influence” (even “leverage”) unfortunately has at times been applied to these contacts, providing critics of military assistance with a convenient straw man. (“If you *have* influence, you must be responsible for coups and expensive arms buys; if you *don't* have influence, then the program has failed!”) Considering the limited weight and scope of our current military programs in Latin America, those who expect them to produce “influence” on any specific, significant issue must have a low opinion indeed of the intelligence or integrity of Latin American military officers.

What these direct military contacts do afford is some mutual understanding and respect and, at times, a degree of affinity or tolerance that helps keep communications open and cordial when they might otherwise be closed—or loaded with hostility. The benefits have served U.S. diplomatic efforts on many occasions, as ambassadors have gratefully acknowledged.

Is “concessional” military assistance necessary to preserve these relationships? Einaudi, in another work<sup>15</sup> that also deals principally with the larger South American countries, argues that grant materiel assistance should be totally eliminated; yet he favors continuation of the training program, FMS credits, and military missions (again reduced!) as consistent with the current approach of “mature partnership” and mutual respect. Apparently, much depends upon what one calls “concessional.” Perhaps it would be possible to regard our current level of military cooperation with Latin America as a *representation* effort, rather than as an assistance program.

We might even regard these programs as simply the normal courtesies any major

power would be likely to extend to neighboring allied countries with which it wished to maintain amicable relations—someplace between *noblesse oblige* and cash-on-the-barrelhead Yanqui trading.

In this light, Mr. Wolpin's zealous polemics are largely of historical interest. *Military Rule in Latin America* is an interesting excursion in technique and a

more objective than usual treatment of its topic. *Beyond Cuba* provides a well-reasoned projection of the circumstances most likely to affect our relations with the Latin American military in the years ahead. Let us hope that Mr. Einaudi's clear Santa Monica perceptions do not dim in Foggy Bottom.

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#### Notes

1. The classic objective study (some would call it sympathetic) is John J. Johnson, *The Military and Society in Latin America* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964). For a classic hostile treatment, see several chapters in J. Petras and M. Zeithin, editors, *Latin America: Reform or Revolution* (New York: Fawcett, 1968). Balanced assessments of the "new military" are in D. Pollack and A. Ritter, editors, *Latin American Prospects for the 1970s: What Kinds of Revolution?* (New York: Praeger, 1973) and Charles Corbett, *The Latin American Military as a Socio-Political Force* (Miami: University of Miami Center for Advanced Political Studies, 1972). The latter book is especially useful in describing the complex political substance that surrounds seemingly simple "military dictatorships." Robert E. Scott, "National Integration Problems and Military Regimes in Latin America," views "new military" regimes as perhaps the only route for achievement of urgently needed societal integration in a political and sociological disaster area, in R. E. Scott, editor, *Latin American Modernization Problems* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973).
2. For example, the "Fulbright provision," in Sec. 510 of the Foreign Assistance Act, has since 1970 limited foreign military trainees in the United States to numbers not greater than were admitted the previous year under provisions of the Fulbright-Hayes educational and cultural exchange programs.
3. "Soviet Tanks to Peru a Mystery," *Christian Science Monitor*, December 17, 1973, p. 1.
4. "United States Military Policies and Programs in Latin America," Hearings, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 19th Cong., 1st sess., July 8, 1969, p. 65 (hereafter cited as "U.S. Policies and Programs").
5. "Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1973," Hearings, Committee on Appropriations, Senate, 92d Cong., 2d sess., p. 870.
6. Mr. Rouquié's chapter is a condensation (less material on Bolivia and Panama) of an article originally appearing in *Revue Française de Science Politique*, XXI, 5-6 (October-December 1971), pp. 1045-69, 1234-59. This is the one chapter of the book that did not emanate from the seminar at the University of Chicago.
7. See, for example, his 1969 testimony before Senator Church's subcommittee in "U.S. Policies and Programs," p. 3ff.

8. Cited by Wolpin (p. 75) from testimony of General Mather in "Foreign Assistance Act of 1969," Hearings, House, pp. 116, 642-63.
9. A full and accurate account of proceedings that led to the ouster of the MILGP was in the *New York Times*, May 18, 1969 (18:4), May 21 (17:1), and May 24 (15); the last date covers Prime Minister Montagne Sanchez's announcement of expulsions and the reasons.
10. "Reports of the Special Study Mission to Latin America on I. Military Assistance Training, II. Developmental Television," House Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, Committee on Foreign Affairs, May 7, 1970, p. 11. This report, of a group headed by Representative Clement Zablocki, also notes cordial relations between Peruvian military leaders and U.S. military personnel and terms the MILGP "a casualty of the dispute" over the IPC issue.
11. See, for example, L. Einaudi and A. Stepan, "Latin American Institutional Development: Changing Military Perspectives in Peru and Brazil," RAND R-586-DOS, Santa Monica, 1971. Also L. Einaudi, "Revolution from Within? Military Rule in Peru since 1968," RAND P-4676, Santa Monica, 1971.
12. L. Einaudi, H. Heymann, D. Ronfeldt, C. Sereseres, "Arms Transfers to Latin America: Toward a Policy of Mutual Respect," RAND R-1173-DOS, 1973 (hereafter cited as "Arms Transfers").
13. Cited in support is a study by Paul Schultz, "Demographic Conditions of Economic Development in Latin America," RAND P-3885, Santa Monica, 1968. Schultz accepts more optimistic bases for a downturn in growth rates than most demographers have admitted. Even if one accepts such optimism over the long term, however, it is regrettable that *Beyond Cuba* does not address the short-term potential for unrest in current population trends that continue to feed *barrios*, *favelas*, and other urban slum areas faster than ambitious programs can cope with them.
14. DOD Congressional Presentation Document "Military Assistance Program and Foreign Military Sales, FY-1974" (document classified). This is a revised formulation of the classic rationale advanced in past Presentation Documents: "... to help maintain military and paramilitary forces capable of providing, with police forces, the internal security needed to facilitate orderly political, social, and economic development. . . ."
15. "Arms Transfers," p. 65.



# SECOND JOURNEY OF AN ASTRONAUT

CAPTAIN JAMES E. OBERG

OF the twelve Americans who have walked on the moon and returned to earth, the first few were heroes, honored on world tours and tumultuous parades; the last few can walk down any street in America and not be recognized. Some moved from the space program to new goals: new space flights, religion, areas of lifelong interests now made possible. One went to a psychiatrist and has now written a book about it.†

“Buzz” Aldrin was the copilot of that memorable first moon landing one Sunday afternoon in July 1969. In the book he describes his own return to earth, a return that begins on page 1 with the Apollo 11 capsule splashing down in the Pacific Ocean. “There is no way to determine which way you’ll end up after landing,” he writes, referring to the two stable floating modes—nose up or nose down—which the Apollo command module can assume. But there was no way then for him to know which way he himself would wind up, either.

We followed Colonel Aldrin’s subsequent career through bits and pieces in the newspapers: world tours, brief projects with Skylab and the future Space Shuttle, a return to Air Force duty as commandant of the Aerospace Test Pilot School at Edwards AFB, his retirement from the Air Force the following year. And then, there were the rumors and stories about psychiatric problems, depressions, and mental illness.

*Return to Earth* describes both of his journeys: the first, to the moon and back with the encouragement and support of

NASA, the United States, and the entire world; and the second, into his own mind, alone, with difficulties and detours thrown in his path by the same forces that had aided him on his voyage to Tranquility Base. While none of us is likely to repeat his first journey for a decade or more, his book tries to be a guide for those who might need help, as he did but which he did not receive, along the second journey.

Readers who are looking for an insider’s view of space flight will find more than enough to satisfy them about Aldrin’s space training and two space flights (the other on Gemini 12 in 1966). Perhaps he told most of the laundered details to *Life* magazine, but now the full, human, believable story comes out. Aldrin and his colleagues found that what most people read and thought about them was a myth compounded of NASA press releases, an unconscious hero worship, and the nation’s desire to find real models in the uncertain times of confused war and fractured social relationships.

This time, he can tell the whole story. The technical and engineering problems are there, along with the human ones. How do people really get picked for space missions? What does it feel like to have your best friend’s death in a plane crash open up your opportunity to make a space flight? What were Aldrin’s real feelings about being selected for the first moon landing? How did the astronauts—mostly military pilots—feel about their “safe” tickets in NASA while their friends were being shot down over Hanoi? What

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† Edwin E. “Buzz” Aldrin, Jr., with Wayne Warga, *Return to Earth* (New York: Random House, 1973, \$7.95), 335 pages, 15 photographs.

triumphs, tragedies, and everyday drudgeries could not until now be told? It's all here, and it makes for a fascinating half of the book.

Aldrin trained for six years to fly to the moon. For what came after, he had not even an hour's briefing. The speeches, parades, world tours, press conferences, and endless ceremonies are described in mind-numbing detail. If Aldrin suffered half as much going through the real thing as the reader does in plowing through page after page of it, one soon appreciates his problems.

But what went wrong inside Aldrin's head? The pressures on him are well described, but they were suffered and endured by other men, like his crewmates Armstrong and Collins, like America's first man in orbit, John Glenn, like many others. What was it about Aldrin, the rock-solid action-minded pilot, that led to depression, mental illness, "dysfunction"? If it could happen to him, could it happen to any of us? Aldrin says it could.

This is the most important part of the book. Until this point, our impressions must be that Aldrin went over the edge because of the terrific pressures of being one of the first men on the moon. Consequently, while we may find his story interesting, it does not appear relevant to our own lives. Aldrin suggests that it is.

He wanted a better explanation than the obvious one that he couldn't handle being a hero. Sure, maybe the rest of his life was a downhill epilogue, a footnote. What could he do to top that day he planted the American flag on the moon? How could he live when the rest of his life was an anticlimax and his best moments were behind him?

Armstrong, for one, managed. He found his way into something he had always wanted: teaching aerodynamics. Glenn entered politics, and although he has not

yet found the success he achieved in space, he found a better thing: a new, more difficult goal. He pursues it yet.

Aldrin had no such goal. He began an aimless drifting. Two years later, after extensive psychiatric counseling, he started to piece together what might have gone wrong.

It soon emerged that my life was highly structured and that there had always existed a major goal of one sort or another. . . . I had gone to the moon. What to do next?

As the philosopher worded it, Aldrin suffered "the melancholy of all things done." He was worse off than Alexander, with literally no more worlds to conquer.

Throughout his life, people had directed him into goals that he had loyally accepted as his own. First his father, then his summer camp in Connecticut, where "the team winning . . . competition was served turkey, and the losers were served beans," then West Point, then the Air Force, then the NASA astronaut team. But when he returned from the moon a celebrity, he was told, "OK, Hero, you're on your own. What do YOU want to do next?"

Goals. The desire to excel. Single-mindedness. These were the qualities that got Aldrin into trouble. But why should anyone be afraid of them? They are supposed to be exemplary qualities of the archetypical American. Yet they almost killed Aldrin.

The second flight to the moon managed to evade the hero syndrome after a perfunctory round of tours, and both moonwalkers stayed on in the space program to command the first and second Skylab flights in 1973. Armstrong and Collins got out and used their prestige and status to achieve their own personal goals.

Aldrin did too, or so he thought. But it wasn't working out right, and he needed some man-to-man advice. Not psychiatric care, certainly not a straitjacket, but just



some honest talk with someone to listen.

At this point, enter the second villain. According to *Life*, NASA, and the new astronaut mythology, Aldrin and his colleagues were perfect men, "... squarely on the side of God, Country, and Family. . . . the most simon-pure guys there had ever been." So Aldrin, when he confided to friends that he thought things weren't perfect, ran into a wall. After a long, intimate conversation with his father-in-law, Aldrin found to his despair that "... it was inconceivable to him that a guy with my drive and accomplishments could feel this way." Even his wife, he thought, "... had really believed all that crap she read about me."

Then, too, he had little choice about where to go for help. He at first had his sessions paid for by NASA health insurance because he didn't want the treatment entered on his military record. Military health coverage would have paid for the financial costs, he reasoned, but "... the repercussion psychiatric treatment tends to have on service careers has no insurance coverage of any kind." Aldrin elaborated:

My personal theory—confirmed by others who, like me, have spent over twenty years learning the military ropes—is that my chances for promotion ended when I asked for psychiatric help.

That attitude may have been a symptom of a paranoia that testified to his real need

for help. Or it might be a realistic judgment, which implies that thousands of others who need mental help are not going to get it for fear of the factors Aldrin describes.

And with this turn of events, he found a new goal. Aldrin is today a director-at-large of the National Association for Mental Health. He decided to write a book describing what happened to him, honestly, fully, in hopes that it might help others with similar problems. No matter from what cause their depression, "dysfunction," or other mental illness might spring, they still needed to seek help without being dissuaded by concern over the stigma that "mental illness" still carries.

Psychiatric science has made some great strides and one of them is that a depression, noticed and diagnosed in its early stages, can be successfully treated. If not, it will only grow until it becomes unmanageable, devastating, and, in some cases, fatal. It is no different from any other illness.

Millions of Americans would be willing to follow in Aldrin's footsteps to his first goal, the moon. But not nearly so many would follow on what he called "... the most significant journey of my life . . .," a journey into his own mind. But Aldrin's book will help those who need to make that second journey find the courage to set out.

Washington, D.C.

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The Air University Review Awards Committee has selected "Stall/Spin Seventy Years Later" by Robert J. Woodcock and Thomas J. Cord as the outstanding article in the May-June 1974 issue of *Air University Review*.

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